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I. INTRODUCTION
Something has got to give.  The Supreme Court has retreated from
more than seven decades of personal jurisdiction analysis.  After
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court’s juris-
prudence of general jurisdiction1 looked like an M.C. Escher print.2  If
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.  B.A., Yale University 1966;
J.D. Columbia University 1969.  I am grateful to my colleagues at Pace for their par-
ticipation in a colloquium on August 6, 2013, and for their penetrating questions and
observations.  My treasured colleague Michelle Simon and my wife Cyndy Pope were
generous with their time reading and commenting on earlier drafts.  I am indebted
also for the fine research assistance that Cassia Horvitz and Cristina Riggio, Class of
2015, and Elizabeth Perreca and Jacob Barnett Sher, Class of 2016, provided.  Ms.
Perreca and Mr. Sher also proved to be exceptionally demanding editors—the best
kind.  Special thanks to Texas A&M Articles Editors Whitley Zachary and Matthew
McGowan; this article is far better for their efforts, and I would have immensely en-
joyed working with them in a teacher-student relationship.
1. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853
(2011).
First, as in International Shoe itself, jurisdiction unquestionably could be as-
serted where the corporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and system-
atic” and that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit.  Further, the Court
observed, the commission of certain “single or occasional acts” in a State
may be sufficient to render a corporation answerable in that State with re-
spect to those acts, though not with respect to matters unrelated to the fo-
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read fast enough, it appeared to make sense.  Closer examination
reveals an intellectual structure as impossible as anything that Escher
could have drawn.3  Then the Court made it worse in Daimler AG v.
Bauman.4  The Court seemingly has begun a project to rein in what it
now regards as states’ unreasonable (and therefore unconstitutional)
assertions of general jurisdiction over corporations.  It has implicitly
backed away from some of International Shoe’s5 minimum-contacts
analysis that dominated the law of constitutional personal jurisdiction
since 1945. Goodyear and Daimler create a far more restrictive con-
cept of corporate presence.  If the Court purports to retain Interna-
tional Shoe’s principle that jurisdictional exercises be fair and
rum connections.  The heading courts today use to encompass these two
International Shoe categories is “specific jurisdiction.”  Adjudicatory author-
ity is “specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.
International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit within the “specific juris-
diction” categories, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities.” Adjudicatory authority so grounded is today called “gen-
eral jurisdiction.”
Id. at 2853 (citations omitted).  General jurisdiction has limits, however.  A court may
have general jurisdiction over a defendant, yet it cannot enter an order directly affect-
ing the defendant’s real property located outside the state. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215
U.S. 1 (1909). Fall, though old, is still good law, but one must recognize its limita-
tions.  The rendering court may not itself (or through a court-appointed agent such as
a commissioner, as in Fall) execute a deed to property in another state.  It can, how-
ever, order the defendant-owner of the property to execute the deed and enforce the
order with the contempt power.  Such an order is also enforceable in other states. See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 102 (1971); id. cmt. d; id. Reporter’s Note to cmt. d.
2. M.C. Escher was a graphic artist.  One of his areas of expertise was drawing
the “impossible structure”—a picture that looked real upon first glance but that closer
study revealed to be a physical impossibility.
With Escher, optical illusion is achieved by means of a representational logic
that hardly anyone can evade.  By his method of drawing, by his composi-
tion, he “proves” the genuineness of the suggestion that he has brought into
being.  And the fascinated viewer, on coming to his senses, realizes that he
has been taken in.  Escher has literally conjured up something before his
eyes.  He has held before him a magic mirror whose spell has been cast as a
compelling necessity.  In this Escher is an absolute master and unique at
that.
The Magic Mirror of M.C. Escher 6 (Bruno Ernst, ed. 1994). E.g., Donald L.
Doernberg, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: Rule Interpleader, the Anti-Injunction
Act, In Personam Jurisdiction, and M.C. Escher, 67 COLO. L. REV. 551, 551 (1996).
3. I am not the only one with this view.  Commenting on the Court’s decisions in
Goodyear and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, Professor Borchers said sim-
ply, “The Supreme Court performed miserably,” although he did allow that Goodyear
was “not nearly as bad” as J. McIntyre.  Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1245, 1245 (2011).
4. Daimler, AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
5. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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reasonable,6 it has implicitly but unmistakably undermined a jurisdic-
tional basis that long antedates International Shoe and that the Court
unanimously reaffirmed only two decades ago in Burnham v. Superior
Court—individuals’ receipt of service of process while in the forum.7
International Shoe set out four basic patterns of jurisdictional con-
cern along two axes.  On one axis, the Court considered the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum, which could be “continuous and
systematic”8 or “single or isolated.”9  On the other axis, the Court ad-
dressed whether the plaintiff’s claim arose from the defendant’s in-
state activities10 or was unrelated.11  Thus, there were four patterns
into which cases might, at least preliminarily, fit: (1) systematic and
continuous contacts and a related claim,12 (2) systematic and continu-
ous contacts and an unrelated claim,13 (3) isolated contacts and a re-
lated claim,14 and (4) isolated contacts and an unrelated claim.15  The
last category has not yielded jurisdiction, with one important excep-
tion: service of process upon an individual within the forum allows the
forum to exercise personal jurisdiction, even with respect to claims
having no forum relationship and even if the individual has no other
forum contacts.16  The first and third patterns give rise to “specific
6. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (“[M]inimum
contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”).
7. I refer here to jurisdiction over an individual based simply on service of the
summons within the forum. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
8. Id. at 317; see also id. at 320 (“systematic and continuous”).  “[T]here have
been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Id. at 318.
9. Id. at 317.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., id.
13. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952);
Bryant v. Finnish Nat’l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. 1965); Tauza v. Susque-
hanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917).
14. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957); Hess v. Pawl-
oski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
15. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 745–46 (4th Cir. 1971).  I
refer to these patterns as Categories 1 through 4, respectively.  With respect to Cate-
gory 2, jurisdiction over corporations, the International Shoe Court noted, “To require
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other
jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too
great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (emphasis added).  The distinc-
tion the International Shoe Court made between the corporate “home” and other
forums where exercising jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable, becomes
quite important when considering Goodyear and Daimler. See infra Part II.
16. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).  Although the Burnham Court was unanimous in its conclusion that
jurisdiction existed, there was no majority opinion and no majority theory supporting
the conclusion. Burnham, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  The real importance of Burnham lies
not in its result, but in the titanic clash between Justices Brennan and Scalia on meth-
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jurisdiction,” while the second pattern concerns “general
jurisdiction.”17
Before International Shoe, states exercised general jurisdiction over
corporations.  In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., for example, Judge
Cardozo carefully recited the connections that Susquehanna Coal (a
Pennsylvania corporation) had with the state that allowed jurisdic-
tion.18  He also listed contacts that the defendant could have had but
did not.19  His opinion told the reader nothing about the plaintiff’s
claim save that “the jurisdiction does not fail because the cause of
action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the business here
transacted.”20  Referring to defendant’s coal shipments to New York,
he observed:
They are made in response to orders transmitted from customers in
New York.  They are made, not on isolated occasions, but as part of
an established course of business.  In brief, the defendant maintains
an office in this state under the direction of a sales agent, with eight
salesmen, and with clerical assistance, and through these agencies
systematically and regularly solicits and obtains orders which result
in continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York.
To do these things is to do business within this state in such a
sense and in such a degree as to subject the corporation doing them
to the jurisdiction of our courts.21
ods of constitutional interpretation more generally. Compare id. at 622–27 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment), with id. at 629–37 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
17. See supra notes 12–15, and accompanying text.
18. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916.
The defendant’s principal office is in Philadelphia; but it has a branch office
in New York, which is in charge of one Peterson.  Peterson’s duties are de-
scribed by the defendant as those of a sales agent.  He has eight salesmen
under him, who are subject to his orders.  A suite of offices is maintained in
the Equitable Building in the city of New York, and there the sales agent and
his subordinates make their headquarters.  The sign on the door is “Susque-
hanna Coal Company, Walter Peterson, Sales Agent.”  The offices contain
eleven desks, and other suitable equipment.  In addition to the salesmen
there are other employe´s, presumably stenographers and clerks.  The sales-
men meet daily and receive instructions from their superior.
Id.
19. Id. at 916–17.
All sales in New York are subject, however, to confirmation by the home
office in Philadelphia.  The duty of Peterson and his subordinates is to pro-
cure orders which are not binding until approved.  All payments are made
by customers to the treasurer in Philadelphia; the salesmen are without au-
thority to receive or indorse checks.  A bank account in the name of the
company is kept in New York, and is subject to Peterson’s control, but the
payments made from it are for the salaries of employe´s, and for petty cash
disbursements incidental to the maintenance of the office.  The defendant’s
coalyards are in Pennsylvania, and from there its shipments are made.
Id.
20. Id. at 918.
21. Id. at 917.
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Operating under the restrictive rubric of Pennoyer v. Neff,22 Judge
Cardozo concluded that “[a]ll that is requisite is that enough be done
to enable us to say that the corporation is here . . . .  If it is here it may
be served.”23  Thus, the Pennoyer basis supporting jurisdiction was
service of process on the defendant within the forum—in effect, tran-
sient jurisdiction over a corporation.
International Shoe cited Tauza as an appropriate example of gen-
eral jurisdiction over a corporation.24  But the Court, borrowing rea-
soning from Judge Learned Hand,25 explicitly repudiated the analysis
that Tauza (following the Supreme Court’s lead)26 had used to reach
that result:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction in-
tended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that
unlike an individual its “presence” without, as well as within, the
state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in
its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.  To say that the
corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process re-
quirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits
against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be
decided.  For the terms “present” or “presence” are used merely to
22. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
23. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 918 (citing St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227
U. S. 218 (1913); Wash.-Va. Ry. Co. v. Real Estate Trust Co. of Phila., 238 U.S. 185
(1915); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)).
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
25. Id. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d.
Cir. 1930)). In Hutchinson, the Court said:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be “pre-
sent” in the foreign state, if we define that word as demanding such dealings
as will subject it to jurisdiction, for then it does no more than put the ques-
tion to be answered.  Indeed, it is doubtful whether it helps much in any
event.  It is difficult, to us it seems impossible, to impute the idea of locality
to a corporation, except by virtue of those acts which realize its purposes.
The shareholders, officers and agents are not individually the corporation,
and do not carry it with them in all their legal transactions.  It is only when
engaged upon its affairs that they can be said to represent it, and we can see
no qualitative distinction between one part of its doings and another, so they
carry out the common plan.  If we are to attribute locality to it at all, it must
be equally present wherever any part of its work goes on, as much in the
little as in the great.
When we say, therefore, that a corporation may be sued only where it is
“present,” we understand that the word is used, not literally, but as short-
hand for something else. It might indeed be argued that it must stand suit
upon any controversy arising out of a legal transaction entered into where
the suit was brought, but that would impose upon it too severe a burden. On
the other hand, it is not plain that it ought not, upon proper notice, to defend
suits arising out of foreign transactions, if it conducts a continuous business
in the state of the forum.
Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141 (emphasis added).  The “something else” of which Judge
Hand spoke was what the Supreme Court would later call “minimum contacts.” See,
e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
26. See supra note 23.
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symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process.27
Nonetheless, corporate “presence” and the related concept of system-
atic and continuous activities remained alive and well as jurisdictional
predicates long after International Shoe.28  Even the Court has not
been immune to making such references.29
Ironically, though International Shoe disapproved the question-
begging concept of corporate “presence,” Goodyear and Daimler rein-
stituted it and used it to narrow the general jurisdiction that Interna-
tional Shoe approved.30  “Home” is, after all, a geographical and legal
term of location. Goodyear and Daimler are irreconcilable with Inter-
national Shoe’s minimum-contacts approach. Daimler is a bit disin-
genuous with respect to that foundation case.  The Court observed:
International Shoe distinguished between . . . exercises of specific
jurisdiction . . . situations where a foreign corporation’s “continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
27. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17; see also Carol Andrews, Another Look at Gen-
eral Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1007 (2012) (“The Court discarded
both the consent and presence theories as unnecessary fictions.”).  Note, however,
that even International Shoe referred to a corporation’s “home.” See Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 317.
International Shoe may have discarded presence theory as unnecessary shorthand,
but other courts continue to regard it as useful, for discussion of corporate presence
continues. The states understood International Shoe to have expanded, not restricted,
available jurisdiction over corporations; courts understand it not as a repudiation of
“presence” jurisdiction so much as a change in vocabulary. See, e.g., Purdue Research
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (2003) (constructive presence of
corporation); Philadelphia v. Borough of Westville, 93 A.3d 530, 533–34 (2014);
Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 488, 490
(1990); Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427, 430 (N.Y. 1961); Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP v. East Chicago, 934 N.E.2d 23, 30–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (presence).
28. See, e.g., Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
1039, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1990) (presence); Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1246
(9th Cir. 1984) (substantial and continuous); Kirkpatrick v. Rays Grp., 71 F. Supp. 2d
204, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (presence); Borough of Westville, 93 A.3d at 533 (continu-
ous and systematic); Nationwide Contractor Audit Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Compliance
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (continuous and system-
atic); Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895, 896 (N.Y. 1972) (presence). See
also James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop:  A Welcome Refinement of the Language
of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 981 n.81 (2012)
(citing additional cases); id. at 982 (“Other courts appear to require some sort of
continuous physical business presence. . . .”) (citing cases).
29. See, e.g., Daimler, AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (“essentially at
home”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2853–54 (2011)); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980) (defendant corporation
“found” in every state).
30. See Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 991.  “[A] limitation of general jurisdiction
over corporations to places where they are ‘at home,’ appears clearly to envision
fewer places than one could envision under tests of ‘presence,’ ‘doing business,’ and
‘continuous and systematic general business contacts.’” Id.
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dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”  As we have since
explained, “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in
the forum State.”31
This analysis ignores the two general-jurisdiction cases involving cor-
porations that the International Shoe Court cited and obviously
approved.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Reynolds32 summarily af-
firmed a state-court judgment resting on the Court’s opinion in St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Alexander.33  The court in St.
Louis Southwestern Railway ruled that a corporation was “doing busi-
ness” sufficient to support what we now call general jurisdiction,
describing the local office as follows:
Here, then, was an authorized agent . . . undertaking to act for and
represent the company, negotiating for it, and in its behalf declining
to adjust the claim made against it. In this situation we think this
was the transaction of business in behalf of the company by its au-
thorized agent in such manner as to bring it within the District of
New York, in which it was sued, and to make it subject to the ser-
vice of process there.34
The bulk of corporate activity occurred outside New York.35  The de-
fendant was a Texas corporation apparently doing most of its business
in the Midwest.36  The Court’s recapitulation of the defendant’s oper-
ations makes clear that New York was not its principal place of busi-
ness.37  Nonetheless, a unanimous Court found that the corporation
was “present” in the forum.38  “Present” it may have been; “at home”
it clearly was not.
Tauza, which International Shoe also approved, is similar.  The de-
fendant was a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of bus-
iness in Philadelphia.39  It had a small continuous operation in New
York.40 Tauza would have failed the essentially-at-home test of
Goodyear and Daimler.  Accordingly, today’s Court must regard the
International Shoe court as wrong, at least in its approval of Tauza and
31. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318, and Goodyear
Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2853, respectively).
32. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565, 565 (1921) (per curiam).
33. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
34. Id. at 228.  One should note that the transaction underlying the dispute might
have been “related” to the forum in today’s terms, but the Court did not invent that
concept until International Shoe in 1945.
35. See id. at 224–25 (describing the type and locations of corporate activities).
36. See id. at 224.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 226–28.
39. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916 (N.Y. 1917).
40. Id.  See also supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text.
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St. Louis Southwestern Railway.  The International Shoe Court re-
garded the defendants’ forum contacts in Saint Louis Railway and
Tauza as sufficient for general jurisdiction.  The Goodyear-Daimler
Court does not.  I differ with Professor Andrews’s conclusion that
“[t]he Goodyear clarification is not a new standard but is instead the
correct reading of International Shoe.”41 Goodyear articulated a nar-
rower standard and would exclude from general jurisdiction two cases
that International Shoe included.42
As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her concurrence, Daimler ad-
ded a new factor with respect to assertions of general jurisdiction over
corporations;43 I shall call this factor “relative contacts.”  General
jurisdiction now rests not simply on whether the corporation’s con-
tacts are systematic, continuous, and voluminous, but rather on an as-
yet-vague mathematical relationship that the forum contacts bear to
the corporation’s total business. Daimler cleared the way to general
jurisdiction over a small foreign corporation doing most of its business
within the forum while ruling out general jurisdiction over a huge cor-
poration with only a small part of its business in the forum, even
though the amount of the latter’s forum business may dwarf the
former’s.44
Goodyear’s new standard revealed (and Daimler aggravated) a con-
siderable imbalance between corporations and individuals with re-
spect to general jurisdiction.  Both cases sharply limited general
jurisdiction over corporations; neither spoke of whether Burnham v.
Superior Court, which reaffirmed general jurisdiction over individual
defendants based merely on service of process in the forum, retained
vitality.45  Justice Sotomayor raised that question in Daimler,46 but the
majority ignored the point.47  A corporation is now subject to general
41. Andrews, supra note 27, at 1050.
42. Although the parent company Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction,
perhaps it could have done so successfully. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852 (2011).  Is Goodyear USA “essentially at home” in
North Carolina?  According to the corporation’s web site, its global headquarters are
in Ohio. Worldwide Facilities, GOODYEAR, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/ab
out/facilities.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  It has nineteen sites in the United States,
only two of which are in North Carolina. Id. In addition, it has three Canadian sites,
seventeen European sites, and twenty other sites scattered around the world. Id. It
apparently lacks continental sites only in Australia and Antarctica. See id. Ohio is-
sued its corporate charter. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.  It is difficult to conclude
that the corporation is “essentially at home” in North Carolina; only two of its sites
are there, with the other 57 elsewhere. Id. Perhaps the parent company should have
contested jurisdiction, but one should remember that the Court only articulated the
relative-contacts approach three years after Goodyear. See Daimler, AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014). See also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
43. Daimler, AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763–64 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 772.
45. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
46. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. See generally id.
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jurisdiction only in states where it is incorporated, has its principal
place of business, or is otherwise “essentially at home.”48  An individ-
ual remains subject to general jurisdiction in any state in which he
receives service of process.49 Daimler’s relative-contacts approach
makes the disparity in analysis far sharper and more troubling than
Goodyear did.
If the Court purports to retain International Shoe’s minimum-con-
tacts approach, it needs to reexamine two aspects of personal jurisdic-
tion.  First, it needs to decide whether huge, multinational
corporations are “too big for general jurisdiction,” as Justice
Sotomayor put it,50 while their tinier counterparts remain subject to it
with far fewer contacts.51  Second, if the quality and quantity of con-
tacts really concern the Court,52 it must find a way to reconcile its
theory of general jurisdiction over corporations with the idea of tran-
sient jurisdiction over individuals. Goodyear and Daimler imply that
huge corporations with extensive activities in a forum may not be sub-
ject to general jurisdiction except in very restricted (and as yet un-
clear) circumstances.53  In contrast, individuals are exposed to general
jurisdiction based only on a few minutes presence in the forum and
the happenstance of in-state service.  The contacts sufficient to sup-
48. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. Goodyear equated a corporation’s states of in-
corporation and principal place of business with an individual’s domicile, making
them, in effect, corporate homes for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 2853–54.  There is
considerable scholarly debate about what this beguiling phrase actually means. See,
e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.
C. L. REV. 527 (2012); Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of
Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012).  At least one state supreme
court, however, views the phrase as limited to a corporation’s states of incorporation
and principal place of business. See Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 328
P.3d 1152, 1158 (Nev. 2014). But see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1067.5 at 292 (Supp. 2014) (“If the
Goodyear opinion stands for anything, aside from the limited proposition that stream
of commerce theory is an inappropriate base for general jurisdiction, it simply reaf-
firms that defendants must have continuous and systematic contacts with the forum in
order to be subject to general jurisdiction.”).
49. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628–29 (1990).  In Burnham,
Justice Brennan used the label “‘transient jurisdiction’ to refer to jurisdiction pre-
mised solely on the fact that a person is served with process while physically present
in the forum State.” Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  Courts and
scholars often refer to this basis for jurisdiction as “tag jurisdiction.” See, e.g., In re
Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 179 (2002); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitu-
tional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 24 (1990) (recognizing Burnham as having validated tag juris-
diction for individuals).
50. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).  Many cases involving
huge corporations are, however, quite distinguishable from Goodyear and Daimler.
See infra notes 134–36, 145–63 and accompanying text.
52. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945) (focusing on quan-
tity and quality of corporate contacts).
53. Goodyear and Daimler are only suggestive because neither addressed the case
of extensive corporate forum contacts. See infra notes 145–63 and accompanying text.
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port general jurisdiction over individuals should mirror those the
Court requires for corporations.54  General jurisdiction over individu-
als cannot soundly rest on the doctrinal underpinning that Goodyear
and Daimler leave for it.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II briefly considers the
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction over corporations from Pen-
noyer through International Shoe.  Part III discusses the Goodyear and
Daimler changes in the Court’s approach to general jurisdiction over
corporations.55  Part IV examines Goodyear’s and Daimler’s implica-
tions for International Shoe’s jurisdictional theory.  Part V explores
the constitutional incongruence between standards of general jurisdic-
tion over corporations and individuals.
II. DROPPING THE SHOE: CORPORATE “PRESENCE” OVERTAKES
MINIMUM CONTACTS
A. Pennoyer Procrusteanism
Pennoyer was the Court’s first venture into personal jurisdiction.56
It prescribed four permissible bases:  (1) consent, (2) residence, (3)
service of process within the forum, and (4) property within the fo-
rum.57  The first three conferred in personam jurisdiction, the fourth
conferred in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.58 Pennoyer’s focus was
exclusively territorial.59  That immediately presented problems with
54. That is not necessarily to say that Goodyear and Daimler are too narrow or
that Burnham is too broad, only that there should not be such a gulf between them.
This in turn requires reconsideration of International Shoe’s theory of personal juris-
diction and the divergent readings of it that Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan ex-
pressed in Burnham. See supra note 16.
55. The Court elaborated International Shoe’s minimum-contacts test many times
after deciding International Shoe, but with the exceptions noted below, see infra notes
88–91 and accompanying text, all of those cases involved specific jurisdiction.  “Since
International Shoe, ‘specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern juris-
diction theory, while general jurisdiction [has played] a reduced role.’  . . .  Our post-
International Shoe opinions on general jurisdiction, by comparison, are few.”
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755.
56. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).  “Personal jurisdic-
tion” encompasses all forms of a court’s entitlement to exercise power over the defen-
dant or the defendant’s interests, including as subdivisions in personam jurisdiction, in
rem jurisdiction, and quasi in rem jurisdiction. See id. at 727.
57. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723–26, 729 (The Court implied the residence basis for
personal jurisdiction with its repeated references to “judgments rendered against non-
residents without personal service of process upon them.”) (emphasis added).  In-
forum service replaced the much earlier English method of asserting personal jurisdic-
tion: the capias ad respondendum, “[a] writ commanding the sheriff to take the defen-
dant into custody to ensure that the defendant will appear in court.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 250 (10th ed. 2014); see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723–26.
58. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725, 729.
59. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722: (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory . . . .  [N]o State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its terri-
tory.”).  Consent to jurisdiction is an apparent contradiction to these principles, be-
2014] RESOLING INTERNATIONAL SHOE 257
respect to non-consenting corporations.  Where does a corporation
“reside”?  Often corporations received their charters from one state
but did business only in another.60  For that matter, where is a corpo-
ration for purposes of making service?61  As Professor Stein has
pointed out, the very nature of a corporation is that “the person of a
corporation [ironically, considering the noun itself] is not embodied in
any physical form comparable to an individual’s body.”62  Corpora-
tions are incorporeal; they “have no feet.”63
Serving process on a corporation was complicated.  Early courts
ruled that one could effect service by delivering the summons to a
corporate director or high-ranking officer.64  Some states also re-
quired corporations doing business within them to appoint a desig-
nated state official as an agent for service of process.65  The question
cause a defendant might enter a general appearance in an action without being in the
forum.  One suspects that the Court would have characterized this as the defendant
being constructively within the forum.
60. That circumstance led to considerable difficulty in the area of diversity juris-
diction.  The diversity jurisdiction statute, currently at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), origi-
nally provided that diversity jurisdiction existed when the suit was “between a citizen
of the State where where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”  Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2012)).  In 1958, Congress amended § 1332 to provide that for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, a corporation was also a citizen of the state in which its “principal place
of business” is located.  Act of July 25, 1958, Publ. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415
(1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012)).  That, in turn, created the
problem of how to define “principal place of business.”  Different federal courts de-
veloped different approaches, based either on where the corporate headquarters were
(known as the “nerve center” test) or where the corporation carried on most of its
“business activity.”  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 91–92 (2010).  The Supreme
Court finally settled the question by adopting the nerve-center test. Id. at 78–79.
61. The Court had wrestled with related questions long before Pennoyer.  Writing
about diversity (subject matter), not personal, jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall’s
unanimous Court said that a corporation could not be a citizen of any state for diver-
sity purposes. See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–87 (1809)
(cited with approval in Hertz, Inc., 559 U.S. at 84 (2010)). Deveaux only allowed
diversity jurisdiction involving corporations if “the corporation’s shareholders were
all citizens of a different State from the defendants. . . .” Id. It took almost half a
century after Deveaux for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that corporations had
their own citizenship for diversity purposes. See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558–59 (1844).  Although the Court in both
cases was speaking of subject-matter jurisdiction, its narrow view of the corporate
entity nonetheless makes the cases relevant.  In the area of personal jurisdiction, the
concept of the corporate entity became enormously important.
62. Stein, supra note 48, at 534–35 (citing Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pen-
noyer to Denckla, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577 (1958)).
63. Id. at 534.
64. See, e.g., Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. v. Daughtry, 138 U.S. 298,
303–04 (1891) (following Tennessee statute calling for service on “president or other
head of a corporation, or, in his absence, on the cashier, treasurer, or secretary, or, in
the absence of such officers, on any director of such corporation”); see also JOSEPH H.
BEALE, JR., 1 TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87.2, at 368 (1935).
65. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW, § 304 (McKinney 2010); § 631, KY. STAT. 1899
(Laws 1893, chap. 171, § 94); see generally BEALE, supra note 64, § 91.1, at 394–95.
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arose whether a state had jurisdiction over corporations under Pen-
noyer’s presence-plus-service rationale simply because a director or
officer received the summons within the state.  Some states exercised
jurisdiction on that basis.66  The Supreme Court disapproved unless
the corporation was doing business in the state and the person receiv-
ing service was authorized to act in the state on corporate business.67
Corporate activity was the touchstone.68
Pennoyer’s jurisdictional regime is notable both for its rigidity and
for courts’ creativeness in fitting cases within it.  The Supreme Court
held that a foreign corporation was amenable to forum jurisdiction if
it carried on business in the forum:
[W]hen a corporation of one state goes into another, in order to be
regarded as within the latter it must be there by its agents author-
ized to transact its business in that state. . . .  It has been frequently
held by this court, and it can no longer be doubted, that it is essen-
tial to the rendition of a personal judgment that the corporation be
‘doing business’ within the state.69
Tauza70 followed that approach, resting partly on the concept of “do-
ing business within the state.”71  It explicitly linked such activity to
one of the Pennoyer bases:  service of process within the forum.72  To
bring the case within that description, Judge Cardozo emphasized re-
peatedly that the activities that the corporate defendant’s agents car-
ried on within the forum rendered the corporation present in the
forum.73  Referring to corporate presence, he used “here” eleven
In most of the American States a foreign corporation is now required before
doing business in the State to appoint an agent for service of process upon it.
The statute may require the selection of some real agent of the corporation,
or the acceptance of a state official for that purpose.
Id.
66. See, e.g., Hiller v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R., 70 N.Y. 223 (1877).
67. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914)
(“The mere presence of an agent upon personal affairs does not carry the corporation
into the foreign state.”). Accord, Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Mene-
fee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. 518, 521-
22; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 357 (1882).
68. Int’l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 583 (citing St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexan-
der, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1913) (“[I]t is essential to the rendition of a personal judgment
that the corporation be ‘doing business’ within the state.”) (emphasis added); River-
side, 237 U.S. at 194–95  (referring to lack of jurisdiction where corporation “doing
[no] business therein, or has done no business therein) (emphasis added). See also
Goldey, 156 U.S. at 521–22 (noting ineffectiveness of service on corporate agent not
in the forum on corporate business); St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 355, 357  (allowing jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporation provided “the corporation be engaged in business in the
state, and the agent [receiving service] be appointed to act there”) (emphasis added).
See generally BEALE, supra note 64, § 88.3, at 371–76.
69. Int’l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 583 (citing St. Louis Sw. Ry., 227 U. S. at 226 (col-
lecting cases)).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21.
71. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
72. Id. at 918.
73. See supra text accompanying note 18–19.
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times in an opinion spanning little more than three pages; it is a verita-
ble mantra.74
Other states also strained to fit cases into the Pennoyer framework.
The non-resident-motorist statute was one of the best-known devices.
The Court twice approved such statutes. Kane v. New Jersey upheld a
statute that required non-resident drivers to execute and file a docu-
ment appointing the secretary of state as the drivers’ agent for service
of process in cases arising from their in-state driving.75  If they failed
to do so, they were subject to arrest and punishment.76  In Hess v.
Pawloski, the Massachusetts statute provided that driving in the state
constituted appointment of a state official as the driver’s agent for
service for claims arising out of driving in Massachusetts.77  A unani-
mous Court upheld the theory of the non-resident-motorist statute,
reaffirming Pennoyer’s territorial approach.78  Thus, the Massachu-
setts statute substituted implied appointment from the fact of driving
in the state for New Jersey’s explicit appointment, and the Court had
no difficulty finding the difference insignificant for constitutional pur-
poses.79 Kane’s and Hess’s importance for present purposes is their
creative adherence to Pennoyer Procrusteanism.
74. The oxymoron of attributing physical presence to an incorporeal entity for
purposes of service of process was consistent with the then-reigning theory of choice-
of-law.  In cases having connections with more than one state, the vested-rights ap-
proach to conflict of laws relied upon treating a multi-faceted transaction or event as
if it happened entirely within one state, a process known as localization. See Larry
Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 992 (1991).  Thus, the courts
decided tort cases using the law of the state where the injury occurred even if, for
example, the defendant’s negligent act occurred in some other state. See, e.g., Ala. G.
S. R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (Ala. 1892); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 377 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT].  Similarly, the law of
the state where the parties contracted governed disputes arising out of the contract
whether or not they arose in the same state. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT, supra,
at §§ 332–34.  Both the choice-of-law and jurisdictional approaches of the time have
their roots in Pennoyer’s exclusive reliance on territoriality. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
75. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 166–67 (1916).
76. Id. at 164–65.
77. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).  For the text of the Massachusetts
statute, see id. at 354.
78. “There must be actual service within the state of notice upon him or upon
some one [sic] authorized to accept service for him.  A personal judgment rendered
against a nonresident, who has neither been served with process nor appeared in the
suit, is without validity.” Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 356–57.
[I]n advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a nonresi-
dent, the state may require him to appoint one of its officials as his agent on
whom process may be served in proceedings growing out of such use.
[Kane] recognized power of the state to exclude a nonresident until the for-
mal appointment is made. And, having the power so to exclude, the state
may declare that the use of the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent
of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served.
The difference between the formal and implied appointment is not substan-
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B. Breaking Pennoyer’s Bonds
International Shoe ameliorated the need to strain to fit within Pen-
noyer’s four bases.80  The Court did not discard them,81 but it did
adopt an entirely new approach to the due process analysis.82 Pen-
noyer rested exclusively on territoriality; International Shoe partially
rejected it.83  It disapproved the fiction of corporate presence, relying
heavily on Learned Hand’s analysis.84  It expanded the reach of per-
sonal jurisdiction beyond the purely territorial and articulated a new
constitutional test, recasting the personal jurisdiction inquiry in terms
of “minimum contacts.”  Noting that jurisdiction originally rested only
on presence,85 Chief Justice Stone observed:
tial, so far as concerns the application of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).  The Court did distinguish between cases involving individuals
and those involving corporations.  It noted that a state could not exclude individuals
as it could corporations, and could not prevent individuals from transacting business.
Kane shows that although the state cannot exclude individuals, it can keep their vehi-
cles out. Id.
80. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–18 (1945).
81. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 (1977), while not eliminating quasi in rem
jurisdiction, significantly restricted it by ruling that property in the forum unrelated to
the parties’ dispute, without more, was insufficient to satisfy International Shoe’s due-
process approach. Id. at 196–98.
82. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–18.
83. Id. at 316.
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to
be acted upon as though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that unlike an individual
its “presence” without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be mani-
fested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized
to act for it.  To say that the corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy
due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of
suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided.
For the terms “present” or “presence” are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem
to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.
Id. (citation omitted).
84. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
85. “Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judg-
ment personally binding him.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See also Stein, supra note
48, at 534 (“The sole measure of constitutional legitimacy in Pennoyer was the physi-
cal presence of the person or property of the defendant in the forum at the time that
jurisdiction was asserted.”).
Professor Hazard has criticized this view and Pennoyer’s entirely territorial ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 252–72.  In Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the opinion), Justice Scalia
rejoined, after noting Professor Hazard’s reservations (and also citing Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Fo-
rum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956)), “Accurate or not, however, judging by the
evidence of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous decisions, one must conclude
that . . . understanding was shared by American courts at the crucial time for present
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But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”86
State and federal courts, legal scholars, and countless lawyers and law
students have been trying to attribute somewhat predictable meaning
to “minimum contacts” and “traditional notions” ever since.
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS
Every student of Civil Procedure knows the cases that command
primary attention: International Shoe Co. v. Washington,87 Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,88 Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia S.A. v. Hall,89 Goodyear,90 and now, Daimler.91  Although In-
ternational Shoe was not a general jurisdiction case, it articulated the
jurisdictional analysis that the Court faithfully used—until Goodyear
and Daimler.  In dictum, it cautiously recognized general jurisdiction
over corporations:  “[T]here have been instances in which the continu-
ous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”92
purposes:  1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.” Accord, IV
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 48, § 1064, at 335–36 (2002).
86. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).  Thus, this most famous phrase from International Shoe—“certain minimum
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice’ ”—suggests recognizing what one might call “pres-
ence proxies.” See infra notes 244–68 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. International Shoe was not a general
jurisdiction case; the state’s claim against the corporation arose exclusively from ac-
tions by corporate agents within Washington.  That caused the Court to note that
amenability to jurisdiction “has never been doubted when the activities of the corpo-
ration there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued on. . . .” Id. at 317.
88. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
89. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
90. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
91. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  As the Goodyear Court noted,
“Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circum-
stances that warrant exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving
‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having their impact within the forum State.”
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
92. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255
U.S. 565 (1921) and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)). See
supra notes 19–23, 32–36, and accompanying text.  The caution came a page earlier:
[I]t has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in
the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there.  To require the corporation in
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Of its four general jurisdiction cases involving corporate defend-
ants, the Court has only upheld jurisdiction in Perkins.  During World
War II, the defendant, a Philippine mining corporation, suspended op-
erations because of the Japanese occupation.93  There is no indication
in the opinion that the company had mining operations anywhere
other than the Philippines.94  During the occupation, the company
president, who was also the general manager and principal stock-
holder, conducted the corporation’s few business affairs from his Ohio
home.95  As the Court summarized those activities: “Thus he carried
on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
limited wartime activities of the company.”96  Although the corpora-
tion’s forum activities were not as extensive as those of many large
corporations today, the Court allowed Ohio to assert personal
jurisdiction.97
In Helicopteros, the Court refused to allow Texas to exercise gen-
eral jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation that had a continuous
(but limited) course of contact with Texas.98  The defendant’s com-
mercial helicopter business operated entirely in South America.99  As
the Court described the activities, they sounded at least as voluminous
such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdic-
tion where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay
too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with
due process.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
93. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447.
94. Id. at 448.
95. Id. at 447–48.
There he maintained an office in which he conducted his personal affairs and
did many things on behalf of the company.  He kept there office files of the
company.  He carried on there correspondence relating to the business of
the company and to its employees.  He drew and distributed there salary
checks on behalf of the company, both in his own favor as president and in
favor of two company secretaries who worked there with him.  He used and
maintained in Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts carrying
substantial balances of company funds.  A bank in Hamilton County, Ohio,
acted as transfer agent for the stock of the company.  Several directors’
meetings were held at his office or home in Clermont County.  From that
office he supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corpora-
tion’s properties in the Philippines and he dispatched funds to cover
purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation. . . .  He there discharged his
duties as president and general manager, both during the occupation of the
company’s properties by the Japanese and immediately thereafter.  While no
mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the company, many of
its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the per-
sonal attention of its president in that State at the time he was served with
summons.
Id.
96. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 448.
98. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418–19
(1984).
99. Id. at 409.
2014] RESOLING INTERNATIONAL SHOE 263
as those of Benguet in Perkins.100  There were a few differences, how-
ever: Benguet conducted directors’ meetings at its president’s Ohio
home and had an Ohio bank act as a stock transfer agent.101  To the
extent that Benguet had a principal place of business during the Japa-
100. Id. at 410–11.
At the time of the crash, respondents’ decedents were employed by Con-
sorcio, a Peruvian consortium, and were working on a pipeline in Peru.
Consorcio is the alter ego of a joint venture named Williams–Sedco–Horn
(WSH).  The venture had its headquarters in Houston, Tex.  Consorcio had
been formed to enable the venturers to enter into a contract with Petro
Peru, the Peruvian state-owned oil company.  Consorcio was to construct a
pipeline for Petro Peru running from the interior of Peru westward to the
Pacific Ocean.  Peruvian law forbade construction of the pipeline by any
non-Peruvian entity.  The participants in the joint venture were Williams In-
ternational Sudamericana, Ltd., a Delaware corporation; Sedco Construc-
tion Corporation, a Texas corporation; and Horn International, Inc., a Texas
corporation.  Consorcio/WSH needed helicopters to move personnel, mater-
ials, and equipment into and out of the construction area.  In 1974, upon
request of Consorcio/WSH, the chief executive officer of Helicol, Francisco
Restrepo, flew to the United States and conferred in Houston with repre-
sentatives of the three joint venturers.  At that meeting, there was a discus-
sion of prices, availability, working conditions, fuel, supplies, and housing.
Restrepo represented that Helicol could have the first helicopter on the job
in 15 days.  The Consorcio/WSH representatives decided to accept the con-
tract proposed by Restrepo.  Helicol began performing before the agree-
ment was formally signed in Peru on November 11, 1974.  The contract was
written in Spanish on official government stationery and provided that the
residence of all the parties would be Lima, Peru.  It further stated that con-
troversies arising out of the contract would be submitted to the jurisdiction
of Peruvian courts.  In addition, it provided that Consorcio/WSH would
make payments to Helicol’s account with the Bank of America in New York
City.
Aside from the negotiation session in Houston between Restrepo and the
representatives of Consorcio/WSH, Helicol had other contacts with Texas.
During the years 1970–1977, it purchased helicopters (approximately 80% of
its fleet), spare parts, and accessories for more than $4 million from Bell
Helicopter Company in Fort Worth.  In that period, Helicol sent prospective
pilots to Fort Worth for training and to ferry the aircraft to South America.
It also sent management and maintenance personnel to visit Bell Helicopter
in Fort Worth during the same period in order to receive “plant familiariza-
tion” and for technical consultation.  Helicol received into its New York City
and Panama City, Fla., bank accounts over $5 million in payments from Con-
sorcio/WSH drawn upon First City National Bank of Houston.  Beyond the
foregoing, there have been no other business contacts between Helicol and
the State of Texas.  Helicol never has been authorized to do business in
Texas and never has had an agent for the service of process within the State.
It never has performed helicopter operations in Texas or sold any product
that reached Texas, never solicited business in Texas, never signed any con-
tract in Texas, never had any employee based there, and never recruited an
employee in Texas.  In addition, Helicol never has owned real or personal
property in Texas and never has maintained an office or establishment there.
Helicol has maintained no records in Texas and has no shareholders in that
State.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
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nese occupation, it clearly was Ohio, although the Perkins Court did
not use that diversity-derived term in its opinion.102
It is not astonishing that the Helicopteros Court declined to allow
the exercise of general jurisdiction.  On the other hand, Perkins de-
scribed Benguet’s Ohio activities as “a continuous and systematic, but
limited, part of its general business,”103 and the Texas activities of the
Colombian corporation in Helicopteros come within that shorthand
description.  But the Court, relying on a case antedating International
Shoe by two decades,104 concluded that Helicopteros was not subject
to general jurisdiction.105  The Court mentioned Perkins, but it never
distinguished it, for which Justice Brennan took the majority to
task.106  Most important for present purposes is that neither Perkins
nor Helicopteros discussed the relationship of the foreign corpora-
tion’s forum business with its total business activities.  The Court did
not invent that comparison until Daimler.107
A. Enter Goodyear
The accident underlying the Goodyear tort claim happened near
Paris, France, allegedly because of a defectively manufactured tire.108
North Carolina attempted to exercise general jurisdiction over three
of Goodyear USA’s European subsidiaries.109  The sudsidiaries’ con-
102. Id. at 447–48.  There is no indication in the facts that any aspect of
Helicopteros’ corporate governance occurred in Texas, a clear distinction from Per-
kins. Helicopteros did not use “principal place of business” either; that term did not
appear in conjunction with personal jurisdiction until Goodyear. See id.
103. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
104. See Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923)
(holding in-state purchases and other related trips insufficient to support inference of
presence and, hence, general jurisdiction).
105. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
106. See id. at 420–24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Professor Brilmayer and her col-
leagues offered a distinction.  Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Juris-
diction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 744 (1988).
A defendant’s intrastate activity should count more heavily towards general
jurisdiction than its purely interstate activity—that in-state activity which en-
gages the defendant from across the state’s borders. An example of inter-
state activity would be the solicitation of orders from out of state, whereas
intrastate activity would include local manufacturing or management.  This
distinction helps to explain the different results of Helicopteros and Perkins.
In Perkins, the Court permitted Ohio to exercise general jurisdiction over a
Philippine corporation whose forum contacts consisted of directors’ meet-
ings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries,
and the general management of the corporation’s wartime activities by its
Ohio-based president.  Unlike those in Perkins, the contacts in Helicopteros
were not primarily the result of intrastate transactions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
107. See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
108. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
109. Id. at 2851–52.
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tacts with North Carolina were quite limited and indirect.110  The par-
ent company conceded, however, that its own contacts were sufficient
to support general jurisdiction.111  The unanimous Court said the sub-
sidiaries’ contacts were insufficient, noting that the subsidiaries made
no effort to serve the North Carolina market.112  It created the essen-
tially-at-home test for exercising general jurisdiction over corpora-
tions and cited International Shoe.113  But International Shoe did not
say “essentially at home”; it could neither have said nor intended that
gloss on general jurisdiction while simultaneously have approving
Tauza’s result.114  Susquehanna Coal clearly was not “essentially at
home” in New York, and Judge Cardozo did not pretend otherwise.
He rested instead on corporate presence, a concept that International
Shoe rejected even while approving Tauza’s result.115  By creating the
essentially-at-home standard, Goodyear outlawed general jurisdiction
over corporations that International Shoe would have permitted.116
The Goodyear Court distinguished Perkins and aptly used
Helicopteros to demonstrate how much weaker the contacts in Good-
110. As the Court described:
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North Carolina. They have
no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina. They
do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products in North Carolina.
And they do not solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship
tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of petition-
ers’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions manufactured between
2004 and 2007) were distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear
USA affiliates. . . .  Petitioners state, and respondents do not here deny, that
the type of tire involved in the accident, . . . manufactured by Goodyear
Turkey, was never distributed in North Carolina.
Id. at 2852.
111. The Court’s decision, however, casts doubt on whether Goodyear USA should
have made that concession. Id. at 2857. See also supra text accompanying note 42.
112. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. The Court also discussed at length the error
it found in the North Carolina courts’ analysis: confusing the criteria for specific juris-
diction with those for general jurisdiction. See id. at 2854–56.  That discussion is not
relevant to this article.
113. Id. at 2853–54.  Professor Andrews views Goodyear as merely clarifying Inter-
national Shoe’s general-jurisdiction standard.  With all respect, I see it differently. See
Andrew, supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also Andrew, supra note 27.
114. The Tauza Court, hemmed in by the four bases for personal jurisdiction that
Pennoyer had articulated forty years earlier, relied on the corporation’s activities in
New York for the conclusion that it was present in the state. See generally Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917). See supra notes 19–23 and accom-
panying text. International Shoe rejected what it viewed as the fiction of corporate
presence in favor of the minimum-contacts approach. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
115. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 918.
116. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion sought support for the new rule in the International
Shoe opinion.  “A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts with a state,’ Inter-
national Shoe instructed, ‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation
be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.  That is
true, of course, but severed from the International Shoe Court’s simultaneous approv-
ing the Tauza result and citation of Missouri, Kansas, it is misleading.
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year were.117  Helicopteros had direct contacts with the forum in three
respects:  (1) Its president negotiated part of the contract in the fo-
rum; (2) the defendant’s pilots went to the forum for training, and
(3) the defendant had made multiple helicopter purchases from a fo-
rum company.118  If those contacts were not enough to support gen-
eral jurisdiction, it is difficult to imagine how Goodyear’s European
subsidiaries’ much more limited and indirect contacts with North Car-
olina could suffice.  Accordingly, Goodyear should have been an easy
case.  There was no need to announce a new approach to general juris-
diction over corporations. Helicopteros had not, and Goodyear’s facts
were clearer yet.119
B. Daimler
Daimler also involved a foreign claim, this time arising in Argen-
tina.120  The plaintiffs alleged that the German parent company
Daimler had “collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain,
torture, and kill” plaintiffs’ decedents, employees of Daimler’s Argen-
tina subsidiary.121  Plaintiffs sued the parent in California, though
none of the acts alleged had anything to do with California.122
Daimler moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.123  The
plaintiff sought to attribute Daimler’s United States subsidiary’s
(“MBUSA”) California contacts to the German parent.124  Daimler
resisted, relying in large part on Goodyear.125  The subsidiary’s con-
tacts with California were considerable.  Its California sales amounted
to 2.4% of Daimler’s global sales, which were $192 billion annually.126
Thus, the subsidiary’s California sales that year exceeded $4.6 billion.
117. Id. at 2856–57.
118. Id. at 2857.
119. The plaintiffs were not quite finished trying, however.  They asserted what the
Court called a “‘single enterprise’ theory,” seeking to attribute the parent company’s
North Carolina contacts to the European subsidiaries. Id. at 2857.  The Court re-
jected the effort.  “In effect, respondents would have us pierce Goodyear corporate
veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. The Court refused even to consider the
argument, noting that the plaintiffs had never raised the point either in the North
Carolina courts or in their brief in opposition to certiorari (holding that
“[r]espondents have therefore forfeited this contention, and we do not address it.”)
Id.
120. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014).
121. Id. at 751.
122. Id. at 750.
123. Id. at 752.  The district court found the parent’s contacts with California insuf-
ficient to support general jurisdiction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 753.
124. Id. at 752.  The subsidiary was a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New Jersey. Id. In one way, the case is the reverse of Goodyear.
There, the plaintiffs sought to attribute the parent’s North Carolina contacts to the
European subsidiaries. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852.
125. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
126. Id. at 752.
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The Court, unanimous on the result though not on the theory,127
denied jurisdiction.128  Though observing that some subsidiaries might
be agents for their parents in some circumstances, the Court disap-
proved the Ninth Circuit’s approach.129  “The Ninth Circuit’s agency
theory . . . appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdic-
tion whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome
that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdic-
tion’ we rejected in Goodyear.”130  To that point, the opinion was
unexceptional.
The Court then introduced “relative contacts” in personal jurisdic-
tion.  Referring to Goodyear’s essentially-at-home formulation, the
Court observed:
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California,
and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler,
there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdic-
tion in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly
render it at home there.131
One may wonder how, if MBUSA’s contacts are sufficient to establish
at-home status, they suddenly become insufficient if attributed to the
parent.132  The Court explained in a footnote:
[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not “focu[s] solely on the
magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.”  General jurisdic-
tion instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in
their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.  A corporation that oper-
ates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.
Otherwise, “at home” would be synonymous with “doing business”
tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United
States.  Nothing in International Shoe and its progeny suggests that
127. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment only and filed an opinion disput-
ing the majority’s analysis and setting out her own. See id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
128. Id. at 761–62.
129. Id. at 759.
130. Id. at 759–60 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)).  Justice Ginsburg observed that the plaintiffs had declined to
rely on the Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis, and she noted that agency is far more
useful with respect to specific jurisdiction. See id. at 759 nn.13–14.
131. Id. at 760 (footnote omitted).  The Court was a bit misleading here.  MBUSA’s
forum contacts, sufficient for general jurisdiction by the Court’s assumption, aug-
mented “Daimler’s slim contacts.” See id.  The Court avoided the inferential result by
introducing relative contacts.  Scholars writing before Daimler criticized that ap-
proach:  “Significantly, for purposes of general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the
absolute amount of activity, not the amount of activity relative to what the defendant
does outside the state.”  Brilmayer, supra note 106, at 743 (emphasis added).
132. Justice Sotomayor castigated the majority for its approach.  “Had the majority
applied our settled approach, it would have had little trouble concluding that
Daimler’s California contacts rise to the requisite level, given the majority’s assump-
tion that MBUSA’s contacts may be attributed to Daimler and given Daimler’s con-
cession that those contacts render MBUSA ‘at home’ in California.” Daimler, 134 S.
Ct. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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“a particular quantum of local activity” should give a State author-
ity over a “far larger quantum of . . . activity” having no connection
to any in-state activity.133
Thus, neither the absolute volume of a corporation’s forum contacts
nor the continuous nature of those contacts that will support general
jurisdiction in the future.  Some calculus (known only to the Court)
considers the corporation’s forum business in comparison with its
total business.  A Delaware corporation that does all of its business
in Kansas is subject to general jurisdiction there even if its annual
business amounts only to $50,000 and it has only one employee.
Whereas a corporation like General Motors, which has 3,900 Kan-
sas employees, operates a large manufacturing site that produces a
new vehicle every fifty-eight seconds, and has been in operation
since 1987,134 may not be.135  Perhaps that is the structure the Court
133. Id. at 762 n.20.  One might apply the final sentence to transient jurisdiction as
well. See id. Does anything “in International Shoe and its progeny,” including Good-
year, suggest that an individual’s temporary presence in a state should give the state
authority to adjudicate anything related to the individual’s entire life? See infra text
accompanying note 275.  Perhaps it is equally important that nothing in International
Shoe or its progeny suggests the reverse, either.  Note also that some courts have
exercised general jurisdiction over individuals based on their doing business in the
forum in situations in which it is clear that they are not “essentially at home.” See,
e.g., Harrelson v. Seung Heun Lee, 798 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316–17 (D. Mass. 2011);
ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783–84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
134. See GM Fairfax, Kansas Plant Info, GM AUTH., http://gmauthority.com/blog/
gm/gm-manufacturing/gm-fairfax-assembly/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
135. I infer this from Daimler on the following basis.  If GM manufactures one
vehicle every fifty-eight seconds for a year, never closing the facility, the Kansas plant,
which builds the Buick LaCrosse and Chevrolet Malibu, produces 543,724 cars that
year.  The Malibu that GM pictures on its site has a manufacturer’s suggested retail
price of $25,410. See 2014 Malibu. Model Overview, CHEVROLET, http://chevrolet
.com/2014-malibu-mid-size-sedan.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  GM lists the most
expensive trim model of the Buick LaCrosse at $39,755. See Request a Quote, BUICK,
http://buick.com/request-quote.hmtl (select “2014”; “LaCrosse”; “FWD”; “LaCrosse
Premium II Group”) (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  Assuming that GM manufactures
only that model Buick for an entire year, the Kansas plant would produce approxi-
mately $21.6 billion annual revenue.  The 2013 GM Annual Report shows annual rev-
enue of $155 billion. See General Motors Company 2013 Annual Report, http://www
.gm.com/content/dam/gmcom/COMPANY/Investors/Stockholder_Information/PDFs/
2013_GM_Annual_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  Thus, even the “best case
scenario” for the Kansas plant that I have posited, it accounts for only a bit under
14% of GM’s revenue.  Under Daimler’s relative-contacts approach, is GM “essen-
tially at home” in Kansas?  Perhaps it is; in percentage terms, it has roughly 5.4 times
as much Kansas income as Daimler had California income.  On the other hand, Kan-
sas accounts for less than one-fifth of GM’s annual revenue on the figures used.  If
one assumes the $32,582.50 average price of the high-end Buick and the Chevrolet
Malibu (probably a more realistic figure), the percentage drops to just over 11.5%.  If
an individual spent a comparable amount of a year (about 42 days) in a state which
was not his domicile, would the Court characterize the individual as essentially at
home there?
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wants, but it is difficult to explain it in terms of “minimum con-
tacts.”136
One must note what Goodyear and Daimler did not say.  Both
spoke of corporations being “essentially at home,” prompting
thoughts of corporations’ states of incorporation and principal places
of business—the points of reference for diversity jurisdiction with cor-
porations as parties.137  It would have been easy for the Court to say
that general jurisdiction was available only in those places, but neither
case said that. Daimler was explicit:  “Goodyear did not hold that a
corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum
where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply
typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”138  Both cases cited
Perkins with approval, as an example (the only one at the Supreme
Court level) of proper exercise of general jurisdiction.139  Neither
characterized Perkins as a case limited to its peculiar facts.
Daimler even acknowledged International Shoe’s recognition of
general jurisdiction, quoting Chief Justice Stone’s language.140  It then
quoted Goodyear’s essentially-at-home limitation of Stone’s lan-
guage.141 Goodyear did not comment on the fact that International
Shoe made no mention of general jurisdiction over corporations being
limited to their “homes”; the International Shoe Court used that term
elsewhere in the opinion142 and had a clear chance to limit general
jurisdiction to those two places, yet it did not.  In fact, the language it
subsequently used to describe general jurisdiction (and that Daimler
136. The Daimler Court criticized plaintiffs’ reliance on “‘substantial, continuous,
and systematic course of business,’” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting plaintiffs’
brief declaring “[t]hat formulation . . . is unacceptably grasping.”).  Ironically, the
unanimous Goodyear Court had used “continuing and systematic” as a measure of
sufficient corporate activity. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.  But the plaintiffs had rea-
son to rely on that verbal formulation of “continuing and systematic” contact because
both, Perkins and Helicopteros, had referred to “continuous and systematic” contacts.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952).  In arguing that Interna-
tional Shoe did not stand for the proposition that continuous and systematic business
contacts could give rise to general jurisdiction, the Court ignored those two cases and
the many lower court cases that used essentially the same vocabulary. See supra note
28.
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
138. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.  The Court’s apparent unwillingness simply to adopt
the diversity reference points cannot have been inadvertent; Justice Ginsburg was,
after all, a Civil Procedure professor.  Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Con-
versation with Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 375, 386 (2014).
139. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857
(2011); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–56.
140. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
318 (1945)).
141. Id.
142. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (referring to “‘the inconveniences’ which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of busi-
ness . . . .”).
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quoted) connotes that the Court did not intend such a limitation:
“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate opera-
tions within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings en-
tirely distinct from those activities.”143  That language from Interna-
tional Shoe, only one page after the reference to the corporation’s
diversity citizenships, is inconsistent with the interpretation that
Goodyear and Daimler later placed on it.144
C. General Jurisdiction Over Corporations:  The Empty Record
Perhaps the most striking thing about general jurisdiction over cor-
porations in the Supreme Court is how few times the Court has ad-
dressed it since International Shoe.  There are only four cases,145 and
not one deserves to be called close.146  All involved non-U.S. corpora-
tions.  In Perkins, the action began after the corporation had moved
its corporate headquarters to the forum because of the Japanese occu-
pation of the Philippines.147  In diversity terms, the forum was its prin-
cipal place of business.148  In Goodyear-Daimler terms, it was
“home.”149
The other three cases are notable for the dearth of contacts between
the alien corporate defendant and the forum.  Helicopteros did not
operate in Texas; its only contacts with the forum were the partial ne-
gotiation of the contract, purchasing equipment (including helicop-
ters) from a Texas manufacturer, and sending employees there for
training.150  The case sounded in tort, not contract, and the plaintiffs
143. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
144. Professor Pielemeier regards Goodyear’s approach as “shifting the focus
slightly . . . .”  Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 971.  I see it as a substantial shift in
approach.
145. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
146. Professor Twitchell has noted the “impoverished body of general jurisdiction
case law that fails to explore the question of the state’s general adjudicatory over
nonresident defendants. . . .”  Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610, 612 (1988).
147. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
148. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 91–92 (2010).
149. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 100.  The Court also noted that Helicopteros had deposited
checks from the Peruvian consortium, “the alter ego of a joint venture . . . ” with its
headquarters in Texas. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410.  Why the location of the bank
on which a non-defendant’s checks were drawn to make payments on a contract not
the subject of the action should count as a forum contact for the defendant remains a
mystery. But see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (noting
twice in the jurisdictional discussion that the defendant company had received pre-
mium checks from the forum). McGee is easily distinguishable, however.  There the
action was on the underlying insurance contract, and throughout the insurance period,
the defendant had dealt with the insured in the forum.  Neither was the case in
Helicopteros.
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were not parties to the contract between Helicopteros and Bell Heli-
copter, the Texas manufacturer.151  The Court recited the paucity of
the defendant’s forum contacts.152  In the language of International
Shoe, the defendant had no “continuous corporate operations within
[Texas] . . . so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against
it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.”153  Even Justice Brennan, alone in dissent, acknowledged
that “the Court’s holding on this issue is neither implausible nor unex-
pected.”154 Helicopteros was an easy case.
Goodyear and Daimler were, if anything, easier, which may help
explain why the Court was unanimous on the result in both cases and
unanimous on the reasoning in one.155  Both involved parent corpora-
tions and subsidiaries.  In Goodyear, the parent was a United States
corporation and the European subsidiaries objected to jurisdiction.156
The plaintiffs wanted to attribute the parent’s forum contacts to the
subsidiaries, but the Court refused.157 Daimler presented the reverse
situation:  a European parent with a United States subsidiary, the fo-
rum contacts of which the plaintiffs wanted to attribute to the par-
ent.158  The Court refused again.159  In both cases, the European
defendants had attenuated forum contacts, and no one suggested
those contacts alone were sufficient to support general jurisdiction.
The Court has yet to confront a case between the extremes that
Perkins on one hand and Helicopteros, Goodyear, and Daimler on the
other represent, and those cases tell little about the great expanse that
lies between.  Suppose a corporation carries on extensive operations
in a state that is neither its state of incorporation nor its principal
place of business.  Suppose further, to track the language from
Helicopteros,160 that the corporation sells its product and performs
151. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409–13.
152. Id. at 411.
153. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
154. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan would
have considered the case under specific jurisdiction, but “[a]ll parties . . . concede[d]
that respondents’ claims against Helicol did not ‘arise out of,’ and [were] not related
to, Helicol’s activities within Texas.” Id. at 415.
155. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the Daimler judgment but thought that the
majority opinion was too broad and introduced a new way of approaching general
jurisdiction cases that was unnecessary to the disposition of the case. See supra notes
131–133 and accompanying text.  In a comment after the decision, Justice Sotomayor
noted: “The Court announced a rule limiting the test for general jurisdiction on a set
of facts that were the worst for the exercise of jurisdiction.”  Sotomayor & Green-
house, supra note 138, at 386.
156. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850
(2011).
157. Id. at 2857.  The refusal rested on the plaintiffs’ failure to raise and preserve
the attribution argument in the lower courts or in their brief opposing certiorari.
158. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014).
159. Id. at 759–60.
160. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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consumer services, solicits business, signs contracts, has thousands of
employees, recruits new employees, owns vast tracts of land used for
producing its products and services, maintains multiple offices, and
has many shareholders, all within the forum.  The corporation earns
tens of millions of dollars of revenue (or more) from forum activities.
Perhaps the Court would still not permit the forum to exercise general
jurisdiction; the point is only that Helicopteros, Goodyear and Daimler
are poor authority for saying so because their facts are so different.
Today, the question devolves to whether such a corporation is “essen-
tially at home.”161
Such a case is far from hypothetical, as General Motors’ Kansas
operations make clear.162  Under the Goodyear-Daimler formulation,
is GM “essentially at home” in Kansas?  If the Court had limited that
phrase to a corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of
business, the answer would be no, because GM is a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Michigan.  But the Court
has now had two recent opportunities to announce that limitation, and
it has not.  There is, apparently, some level of corporate activity be-
tween those diversity-jurisdiction reference points and the outer
bounds of Fourteenth Amendment due process that would support
general jurisdiction, but the Court’s opinions give no clue as to what
such a case would look like.163
D. Scholarship on General Jurisdiction
One finds articles on general jurisdiction dating back at least half a
century.164  The last quarter century has witnessed increased inter-
est.165  It will not do to rehearse that scholarship, but it is informative
161. “Home” itself is a tricky concept.  The law speaks variously of “residence” and
“domicile,” but the definition of “home” is simply, “[a] dwelling place.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 849 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  Some people are wealthy
enough to have many homes.  Some corporations are large enough to have many
places where they do huge amounts of business from permanent offices with many
employees.  Whether either of those situations counts as “essentially at home” is not
discernible from Goodyear or Daimler. See generally Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2846;
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746.
162. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
163. It is a mistake to consider Perkins such a case.  There the corporation had
relocated its principal place of business, for the duration of World War II, to the
forum. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984) (“Ohio
was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.”); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952). See also supra text accompanying
notes 145–148.  That clearly falls under the Goodyear-Daimler view of a corporation’s
home. See supra note 48. Accord, Borchers, supra note 3, at 1250–51 (footnote omit-
ted) (“In Perkins, the corporate defendant temporarily relocated its headquarters
from the Philippines to Ohio during World War II.”).
164. See e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241.
165. See, e.g., Emily Eng, A New Paradigm: Domicile as the Exclusive Basis for the
Exercise of General Jurisdiction over Individual Defendants, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 845
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to look at the factors scholars think should determine whether general
jurisdiction is constitutional.166
Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues focused on four considera-
tions:  (1) convenience for the defendant, (2) convenience of the plain-
tiff, (3) state power, and (4) reciprocal benefits and burdens.167  They
concluded that, “[o]n balance, the reciprocal benefits and burdens ra-
tionale provides the most satisfactory basis for the state’s exercise of
coercive power.”168  They also articulated a comparative way of look-
ing at general jurisdiction:  “[T]he due process clause should permit
general jurisdiction on the basis of activities when the defendant
reaches the quantum of local activity in which a purely local company
typically would engage.”169  Note that the comparison is between the
foreign corporation’s forum contacts and those of a local business con-
cededly “at home,” not between the foreign corporation’s forum con-
tacts and its contacts elsewhere in the world, as Daimler would have
it.170  Consider the cases I posited earlier involving massive in-state
contacts of a foreign corporation having its principal place of business
and state of incorporation elsewhere.171  It seems difficult to say with
a straight face that it is “‘fair play and substantial justice’”172 to exer-
cise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation that does all
of its annual $50,000 business in the forum to jurisdiction but some-
(2012); Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General
Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1;
Brilmayer, supra note 106 at 734.
166. Professor Twitchell suggested that the terms “specific jurisdiction” and “gen-
eral jurisdiction” had insufficient and overlapping definitions and argued that one
should speak instead of “dispute-specific” and “dispute-blind” jurisdiction. See
Twitchell, supra note 146, at 611–13.  On the other hand, Goodyear and Daimler
demonstrate that the Court has not taken her advice on terminology. See generally
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2846; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746.
167. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 106, at 730–32.  Professor Andrews is in sub-
stantial agreement with those factors. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1022–25 (con-
sidering (1) reciprocity—a rough balance of benefits and burdens, (2) predictability,
(3) sovereignty, and (4) convenience).
168. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 106, at 733.  “[T]he reciprocal benefits ratio-
nale obtains when the defendant carries out substantial activities, which implicate the
police powers and public facilities of the state.” Id. at 741.
169. Id. at 742.  Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Daimler explicitly adopted this ap-
proach. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. Id. at 734 (“[A]n absolute quantum of activity in a forum may give rise to
jurisdiction.”).
We should not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they
carry on more substantial business in other states; with one possible qualifi-
cation, noted immediately below, the amount of activity elsewhere seems
virtually irrelevant to any of the convenience or fairness policies underlying
the imposition of general jurisdiction over a defendant.
Id. at 742.
171. See supra notes 136, 160–165 and accompanying text.
172. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  This part of the Court’s opinion drew extended adverse
comment from Justice Black. See id. at 324 (Black, J., concurring).
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how unfair to do that to another out-of-state corporation doing more
than 100 times that amount of forum business.
Part of the difficulty lies in the amorphousness of “fair play” and
“substantial justice.”  What do those terms mean?  Perhaps that ques-
tion is unanswerable in all but the most formalistic (and circular)
terms.  Note that the Court, though ostensibly applying that standard
since 1945, has never even attempted to define those terms with re-
spect to general jurisdiction.  Instead, it merely labels the connection
between the defendant and the forum in each case “sufficient” or “in-
sufficient.”  The Court discusses contacts but offers no identifiable
standard to provide guidance to lower courts, counsel, or parties.  Un-
fortunately, it is, reminiscent of Justice Stewart’s famous comment
about “obscenity” in his Jacobellis v. Ohio concurrence:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.173
Apparently the Court knows fair play and substantial justice when it
sees them,174 but with respect to general jurisdiction, it has never de-
fined them. Goodyear and Daimler might have been steps in the right
direction, but both cases lack specificity, which Daimler highlighted by
cautioning against an overly narrow reading of Goodyear.175  Profes-
sor Twitchell pointed out:
As with every jurisdiction question, the more ad hoc it becomes, the
more costly and less predictable it is.  Most courts and commenta-
tors have abandoned the attempt to rationalize the policies support-
ing general jurisdiction, concluding instead that any corporation
engaged in continuous and substantial business in the forum is auto-
matically subject to ‘insider’ status.  In using this adumbrated test,
173. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
174. Justice Scalia took Justice Brennan to task for relying on “contemporary no-
tions of due process” in Burnham:
The “contemporary notions of due process” applicable to personal jurisdic-
tion are the enduring “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
established as the test by International Shoe. By its very language, that test is
satisfied if a state court adheres to jurisdictional rules that are generally ap-
plied and have always been applied in the United States.
But the concurrence’s proposed standard of “contemporary notions of due
process” requires more:  It measures state-court jurisdiction not only against
traditional doctrines in this country, including current state-court practice,
but also against each Justice’s subjective assessment of what is fair and just.
Authority for that seductive standard is not to be found in any of our per-
sonal jurisdiction cases.  It is, indeed, an outright break with the test of
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” which would have to
be reformulated “our notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622–23 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
175. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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courts often overlook the key language in International Shoe quali-
fying the continuous and substantial standard:  “[T]here have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely dis-
tinct from those activities.”176
All Goodyear and Daimler definitively reveal is that “more” was nec-
essary than those cases had.
IV. WHITHER INTERNATIONAL SHOE’S THEORY?
Goodyear and Daimler seem to have clawed back some of the juris-
dictional latitude that International Shoe bequeathed.177  Some believe
that “the Court meant what it said in Goodyear:  general jurisdiction
should be limited, except in an exceptional case, to a corporation’s
state of incorporation and principal place of business.”178  Others take
the position that the Court could not have meant what it said.179  If
that were the only disagreement, Goodyear would have broken no
theoretical ground, as Professor Borchers suggested shortly after the
Court announced it.180
176. Twitchell, supra note 146, at 674–75 (footnotes omitted).
177. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 (2014) (citations omitted)
(disparaging plaintiffs’ reliance on Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) and
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (1917)).
[B]oth [were] cited in Perkins . . . just after the statement that a corpora-
tion’s continuous operations in-state may suffice to establish general jurisdic-
tion. . . . See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 . . . (citing Tauza).
Barrow and Tauza indeed upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction based
on the presence of a local office, which signaled that the corporation was
“doing business” in the forum.  Perkins’ unadorned citations to these cases,
both decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking, . . .
should not attract heavy reliance today.
Id.
178. Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 197, 199 (2014) (footnote omitted).
Despite the lack of fireworks in the Court’s opinion, Goodyear seems likely
to have far-reaching effects on both the doctrine and theory of general juris-
diction. . . . Goodyear added what appears to be a significant new hurdle to
what must be shown to establish general jurisdiction, requiring that the de-
fendant corporation’s “affiliations” with the state be sufficient “to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.”).
Feder, supra note 48, at 672 (citation omitted).
179. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 3, at 1267:
It seems unlikely, however, based on the Court’s description of Goodyear
USA’s contacts that it would have failed to find general jurisdiction over it.
Rather, the opinion’s language juxtaposed Goodyear USA’s extensive con-
tacts with North Carolina for the rhetorical value of contrasting them with
the relatively sparse contacts of its subsidiaries. The clear implication was
that the contacts of Goodyear USA were well on the constitutional side of
the line while the contacts of the subsidiaries placed them well on the other
side.
180. See id. at 1266 (“At a theoretical level, Goodyear is trivial.  The opinion is little
more than an exercise in reasoning by analogy.”).
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But there is more. Daimler added an entirely new dimension to the
general-jurisdiction inquiry.  Contacts still count, but one cannot sim-
ply count contacts.  The advent of relative contacts complicates the
general-jurisdiction inquiry.181  One must now consider more factors
than how long the corporate defendant has maintained contact with
the forum, how many employees it has there, its real estate holdings,
its business expenditures, and its income.  One must weigh those con-
tacts against the corporation’s global activities to see whether they are
a large enough percentage to make the corporation constructively “at
home.”  That makes the general-jurisdiction inquiry murky with re-
spect to giant corporations in Daimler’s aftermath.182
International Shoe did not mention anything resembling relative
contacts, nor did Tauza.183 Perkins, which both Goodyear and
Daimler cite as the paradigmatic general-jurisdiction case for corpora-
tions, makes only a fleeting reference to the defendant’s overall busi-
ness, and that reference cuts against Daimler’s relative contacts
approach.184  Similarly, Helicopteros gave no hint of a relative-con-
tacts approach, noting:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and
the foreign corporation.185
There is nothing here of how much business activity Helicopteros did
outside of Texas, or what percentage of its total business activity oc-
curred in Texas.  The discussion is only of “sufficient” contacts. Inter-
national Shoe made clear that one must consider both the quantity
181. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at
763–64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
182. I use “aftermath” advisedly.  After Daimler, “math” does indeed appear to be
central. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758–62.
183. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe was what one refers to today as a spe-
cific-jurisdiction case. Tauza, obviously, was not, and although Judge Cardozo made
no mention of the corporate defendant’s non-New York business, one might speculate
that as a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania,
it did far more business there than in New York, an inference supported by the lim-
ited nature of Susquehanna Coal’s New York operation. See supra note 19 and ac-
companying text.
184. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (referring to
Benguet’s “continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business”).  Jus-
tice Sotomayor was blunt:  “At no point did we attempt to catalog the company’s
contacts in forums other than Ohio or to compare them with its Ohio contacts.  If
anything, we intimated that the defendant’s Ohio contacts were not substantial in
comparison to its contacts elsewhere.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
185. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)
(footnote and citations omitted).  “In no sense did our analysis turn on the extent of
the company’s operations beyond Texas.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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and quality of forum contacts,186 but Daimler’s relative-contacts ap-
proach is exclusively quantitative.187
Even Goodyear, far closer in time to Daimler and heard by the
same Court, offered only vague hints of what one might construe, in
retrospect, to be a reference to relative contacts.188
To the extent that the company was conducting any business during
and immediately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it
was doing so in Ohio: the corporation’s president maintained his
office there, kept the company files in that office, and supervised
from the Ohio office “the necessarily limited wartime activities of
the company.”189
One doubts that even Einstein would view this as a discussion of rela-
tivity.  And Goodyear’s discussion of Helicopteros invokes no compar-
ison of Texas versus non-Texas contacts, noting only that the
defendant expended “substantial sums” to purchase helicopters, train-
ing, and other equipment in the forum.190
Daimler leaves a critical question open.  The relative-contacts ap-
proach now seems to be important, but it is unclear to what sorts of
cases it applies.  Perhaps it applies only to corporations chartered
outside the United States, though nothing in Daimler suggests that,
and it would be odd for the Court to introduce a special method of
analysis for such corporations. International Shoe’s “fair play and sub-
stantial justice” approach is broad enough to encompass consideration
of corporate alienage.
If the relative-contacts approach is now how the Court will assess
claims of general jurisdiction over corporations, then Daimler is star-
tling, for the Court will have ratified the concept that Justice
Sotomayor’s Daimler concurrence characterized as “too big for gen-
eral jurisdiction.”191  Most giant corporations will not be subject to
general jurisdiction except where chartered or at their principal places
of business.  Much smaller corporations with the bulk of their activi-
ties in a forum other than those two diversity-derived referents will be
subject to general jurisdiction with far fewer contacts.
There will be some practical effects as well.  The relative-contacts
approach will force a plaintiff contemplating suit against a corporation
186. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
187. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761–63.
188. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852 (noting that “a small percentage of petitioners’
tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007)
were distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.”). But see
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Just as in
Perkins and Helicopteros, our opinion in Goodyear did not identify the defendants’
contacts outside of the forum State, but focused instead on the defendants’ lack of
offices, employees, direct sales, and business operations within the State.”).
189.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48).
190. Id.
191. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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in a forum other than its charter state or principal place of business to
undertake more pre-action and pre-trial discovery with respect to the
extent of the defendant’s global activities.192  Jurisdictional inquiries
will become more protracted.  Courts and litigants will spend more
resources on issues other than the merits.  Minimum contacts, far from
a bright-line standard from its inception, will become even more
blurry.  At this point, the Daimler footnote193 is all the guidance the
lower courts have.  The Court’s effort to limit general jurisdiction over
corporations has opened the courthouse doors to far more jurisdic-
tional litigation.
Goodyear and Daimler create another important issue.  The Court’s
effort to curb general jurisdiction over corporations compels asking
whether those two cases will affect general jurisdiction over individu-
als.  The question is acute when jurisdiction rests on nothing more
than the individual’s receipt of the summons and complaint while pre-
sent in the forum—transient jurisdiction. Goodyear and Daimler con-
note that it is impossible for transient jurisdiction to continue to rest
on temporary presence alone, at least if the Court’s jurisdictional ap-
proach is to retain any consistency.
V. DROPPING THE OTHER SHOE: GOODYEAR’S AND DAIMLER’S
IMPLICATIONS AND BURNHAM’S FLAT TIRE
Are corporations people?  In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,
Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues unanimously declared that
corporations are not citizens for diversity purposes.194  The Court ac-
192. Trial judges may regard such discovery as “fishing expeditions.” See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (referring disparagingly to an unbounded,
speculative demand in a subpoena duces tecum); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (10th
ed. 2014) (“An attempt, through broad discovery requests or random questions, to
elicit information from another party in the hope that something relevant might be
found; esp., such an attempt that exceeds the scope of discovery allowed by procedu-
ral rules”) Justice White’s concurrence in Burnham however, seemed to contemplate
precisely that kind of inquiry:
[T]here has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition
the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances
that it should be held violative of due process in every case.  Furthermore,
until such a showing is made, which would be difficult indeed, claims in indi-
vidual cases that the rule would operate unfairly as applied to the particular
nonresident involved need not be entertained.  At least this would be the
case where presence in the forum State is intentional, which would almost
always be the fact.  Otherwise, there would be endless, fact-specific litigation
in the trial and appellate courts, including this one.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).  The Court’s relative-contacts approach presents the
prospect of exactly the sort of endless, fact-specific litigation that Justice White
feared.
193. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
194. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corpo-
ration aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or
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knowledged diversity jurisdiction, not using any concept of corporate
citizenship, but rather on the basis of the citizenships of the corpora-
tion’s members.195  Yet, the Court recognized that well established
English law regarded corporations as inhabitants either by reason of
residence or by “having lands or tenements in any shire.”196  Thus, at
common law, corporations could be present.
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, corporations became both cit-
izens and people.
A corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the
authority of that state and only suable there, though it may have
members out of the state, seems to us to be a person, though an
artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and therefore
entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a
citizen of that state.197
Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues regretted Deveaux’s con-
trary ruling on citizenship.198  Over time, corporations acquired more
be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members,
in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate name. If the corporation
be considered as a mere faculty, and not as a company of individuals, who, in
transacting their joint concerns, may use a legal name, they must be ex-
cluded from the courts of the union.
Id. at 86–87.
195. Id. at 87–88.
196. Id. at 89 (quoting Henry VIII’s “Bridges Act” as recorded in Coke’s statutory
compilation and citing King v. Gardner, 1 Cowper 79, 83 (1774)). See also 22 Hen.
VIII c.5, on which Lord Coke relied; SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, 2 Inst. 697, 702 (Garland Publishing, Inc.
1979).
[A]lthough a man be dwelling in an house in a foraigne County, Riding,
City, or Towne corporate, yet if he hath lands or tenements in his own pos-
session and manorance in the County, Riding, City, or Towne corporate,
where the decayed bridge is, he is an inhabitant, both where his person dwel-
leth, and where he hath lands or tenements in his owne possession within
this statute.
22 Hen. VIII c.5.
197. Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555
(1844).
198. Id. at 555–56.
[T]he cases of Strawbridge and Curtiss and the Bank and Deveaux have
never been satisfactory to the bar, and that they were not, especially the last,
entirely satisfactory to the court that made them.  They have been followed
always most reluctantly and with dissatisfaction.  By no one was the correct-
ness of them more questioned than by the late chief justice who gave them.
It is within the knowledge of several of us, that he repeatedly expressed re-
gret that those decisions had been made, adding, whenever the subject was
mentioned, that if the point of jurisdiction was an original one, the conclu-
sion would be different.  We think we may safely assert, that a majority of
the members of this court have at all times partaken of the same regret, and
that whenever a case has occurred on the circuit, involving the application of
the case of the Bank and Deveaux, it was yielded to, because the decision
had been made, and not because it was thought to be right.
Id.
280 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
and more of the aspects of corporeal beings.  In 1886, the Court recog-
nized corporations as persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.199  By 1906, corporations had Fourth Amendment
rights.200  Twenty-five years later, even alien corporations were enti-
tled to Fifth Amendment due process201 and, subsequently, to the pro-
tection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.202  Most recently, the Court
reconfirmed the First Amendment rights of free speech203 and peti-
tion,204 and a sharply divided Court declared that they are entitled
also to free exercise of religion.205  Thus, corporations have, over time,
acquired more and more of the constitutional protections enjoyed by
individuals.
Goodyear and Daimler demonstrate, however, that corporations
have not acquired the same constitutional responsibilities as individu-
als.206  The Fourteenth Amendment protection they enjoy from state
jurisdictional assertions is far broader than that of individuals.
Daimler underscores the inconsistency of the Court’s approaches to
general jurisdiction over corporations versus individuals.
Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a
forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction
there.  “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it
is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly re-
garded as at home.”  . . .  With respect to a corporation, the place of
incorporation and principal place of business are “paradig[m] . . .
bases for general jurisdiction.”207
199. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (statement of
Waite, Ch. J.).
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the pro-
vision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
Id.
200. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation).
201. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
202. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
203. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010) (citing
First Nat’l. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.18 (1978)).
204. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784; Cal. Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961)).
205. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
206. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdic-
tion in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 127 (2013)
(footnote omitted) (“Corporate personhood is a place where courts have split rights
and obligations asunder to dangerous effect.  Nowhere is this divorce more visible,
consequential, and its effect more painful than in the personal jurisdiction doctrine.”).
207. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2853–54 (2011)); Brilmayer, supra note
106, at 728; Twitchell, supra note 146, at 633.
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Having thus equated individuals and corporations with respect to
domicile and general jurisdiction, the Court has not explained the
chasm between its general-jurisdiction jurisprudence with respect to
each. Burnham v. Superior Court unanimously (though lacking any
majority rationale) ruled that an individual is amenable to general ju-
risdiction in any state where she receives service of process.208  Pres-
ence “counts” for general jurisdiction over individuals.  Although the
Court is no doubt loath to admit it, it rests general jurisdiction over
corporations on a thinly masked concept of presence, limiting it to
three categories, one of them as yet undefined:  (1) place of incorpora-
tion, (2) principal place of business, (3) the exceptional case that
Daimler said Goodyear did not exclude.209  If the test for general juris-
diction for corporations is domicile or where the corporation is “es-
sentially at home,” why do the same limitations not apply to
individuals?
Consider the almost-twin cases of Burnham210 and Kulko.211 The
Kulkos married in California, though both were then (and remained)
domiciled in New York.  When they separated, they agreed that their
two children would live with the father in New York during the school
year and with the mother in California during the summer.  The
daughter later decided she wanted to reverse that arrangement, so the
father bought her a one-way ticket to California.  Subsequently, the
son also wanted to live most of the year in California.  He went there,
unbeknownst to the father, on a ticket that the mother purchased.
The mother sued in California for modification of the divorce decree
to transfer custody and for increased support.  The father resisted ju-
risdiction, and a majority found his contacts with California
insufficient.212
The Burnhams were married in West Virginia, moved to New
Jersey, and had two children.213  The wife moved to California with
the children, where she commenced a divorce action.214  When the
husband was in California for three days on business and to see the
children, he received service in the divorce action, after which he re-
turned to New Jersey.215  The Court unanimously upheld jurisdic-
tion.216  Justice Scalia’s opinion for four Justices relied entirely on
208. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
209. See supra text accompanying note 138.
210. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
211. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
212. Id. Justice Brennan dissented in a one-paragraph opinion. Id. at 101–02.  Al-
though he declined to characterize the majority’s “determination against state-court
in personam jurisdiction [a]s implausible,” he offered no rationale of his own other
than that his “independent weighing of the facts,” caused him to find in favor of juris-
diction. Id. at 102 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 608–23.
216. See id. at 627, 628.
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what it characterized as the centuries-long tradition of basing jurisdic-
tion on service of process on an individual present in the forum.217
For him, that made jurisdiction “consistent with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”218  Justice Brennan’s opinion (also
for four Justices) relied on the defendant’s having visited the forum
for three days as satisfying the purposeful-availment requirement,219
for which Justice Scalia took Justice Brennan to task.220
No one would suggest that Burnham was “at home” in California.
He was no more at home in California than was Kulko, yet the Court
held that there was general jurisdiction over Burnham but not
Kulko.221  Apparently, simply receiving a summons in the forum ren-
ders the individual “at home.”  Of course, the Goodyear and Daimler
Courts used the essentially-at-home formulation to locate a corpora-
tion, not an individual, but it is difficult to justify viewing individuals
and corporations differently for International Shoe purposes.  The
mind balks at saying that Burnham or Kulko had jurisdiction-justify-
ing contacts with California but that giant corporations operating on
massive scales there every day may not.222
The current Court may deny that it has retreated to the pre-Shoe
concept of corporate “presence,” but its current test for general juris-
diction over corporations speaks in quintessentially geographic terms.
“Home” may be where the heart is,223 but it is a place.  When Good-
year and Daimler speak of a corporation being “essentially at home,”
they speak of corporate presence in a place.  The Court has decided
that for most jurisdictional purposes, a corporation is at home only
where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business.
The idea that a corporation is forever at home in the state that in-
corporated it makes no more sense than saying that an individual is
forever at home in her state of birth.  People’s birth certificates reflect
217. Id. at 610–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Brennan dis-
puted that view. Id. at 633–35 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  Professor
Hazard agreed with Justice Brennan about how well established transient jurisdiction
was in England.  Hazard, supra note 164, at 255.  “The defendant’s presence in En-
gland seems to have been less a reason for asserting jurisdiction than an obviation of a
reason why it should not be asserted; it could hardly be said that personal presence
was the basis for jurisdiction.” Id.
218. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316).
219. Id. at 637–39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  Of course, Kulko had
more than visited California; he celebrated his marriage there.  Kulko v. Superior Ct.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978). Perhaps that is what caused Justice Brennan to dissent in Kulko,
but he was silent about his reasons. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637–39.
220. Id. at 623–24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
221. See id. at 627–628.
222. Recall that Burnham was only in California for three days. Burnham, 495 U.S.
at 624. See supra text accompanying notes 212–217.
223. See generally CHRISTINE GLEDHILL, HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS (1987);
Joseph C. Neal, Singleton Snippe. Who Married for a Living, 30 GRAHAM’S AM.
MONTHLY MAG. 165, 166 (1847).
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the state of birth, not the state of domicile.224  Many corporations
have Delaware charters225 but conduct little or no corporate business
in Delaware.226
The Court attempted to distinguish between individuals and corpo-
rations because corporations’ actions may be systematic, continuous
and voluminous in many places simultaneously, while individuals can
be in only one place at a time.  That misses the point, however.  Indi-
viduals may travel to several states in a single day and are subject to
general jurisdiction in each state if they receive service of process
while there.
The Court’s insistence that it is applying International Shoe’s mini-
mum-contacts analysis causes the problem.  An individual may be pre-
sent in a state only fleetingly—changing planes at a hub227—and be
subject to general jurisdiction if the individual receives process in the
airport.  Justice Scalia would argue that presence plus service is a (per-
haps the) traditional basis for jurisdiction and needs no other justifica-
tion.  Justice Brennan presumably would argue that the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum by using the
hub.228  But what about the case of a defendant whose flight is di-
verted from one state’s airport to another’s?  If that defendant re-
ceives process in the airport, what would those two combatants from
224. For example, couples living in New Jersey may go to New York or Penn-
sylvania hospitals for the birth of their children.
225. Former Dean of Stanford Law School Bayless Manning offered the following
reasoning on why this is so:
We, as practitioners, do not go to Delaware to incorporate and to litigate
primarily because the law is “favorable” (whatever that may mean).  We go
to Delaware because there is a vast corpus of sophisticated law there and a
lot of people in the right positions who know what it is all about.
. . . .
[M]y Delaware counsel and I will have a wide ranging and sophisticated
body of corporation law—a jurisprudence if you will—to bring to bear on
almost any problem that will arise.  No other jurisdiction can provide so
much.  And that is why Delaware is, in fact, national, and why its own gravi-
tational pull tends to attract more companies each year and thereby further
reinforce its preeminence.
Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779,
785–86 (1987).
226. Id. at 783 (“The way we know that [Delaware] law is national is simply by
noting the number of companies that are incorporated in Delaware but have no other
link to that state.  One need only add up the incorporation numbers of the Fortune
500 companies from state to state.”).
227. Even being in the airspace over a forum may suffice, raising (so to speak) the
question that many young children ask: “how high is up?” See Grace v. MacArthur,
170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
228. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637–38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia argued that should have led Justice Brennan to uphold jurisdiction over
the individual irrespective of the locus of service. See id. at 623–24 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). See infra note 286.
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Burnham229 have to say about the propriety of exercising
jurisdiction?230
The curious thing about Goodyear and Daimler is their insistence
on equating corporations with individuals for some contacts purposes
but not others.  “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exer-
cise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corpora-
tion it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as home.”231  Fair enough, but both cases glide effortlessly
from that premise to the conclusion that a corporation is amenable to
general jurisdiction only where it is essentially at home.232  That, too,
is plausible, but the Court cannot explain why the approach should
not be the same with respect to general jurisdiction over individuals.
229. See supra note 16.
230. Both might come out the same way, but their positions might be more difficult
to justify.  For Justice Brennan, there is no question that the defendant received sig-
nificant benefits from the forum:  a safe place to land.  On the other hand, it is harder
to argue that there was “purposeful” availment.  Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion
appeared to allow only minimal exceptions to the presence rule—“individuals who
were brought into the forum by force or fraud . . . or who were there as a party or
witness in unrelated judicial proceedings.” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment).  Perhaps Justice Scalia would regard the diverted-flight case
as one where the individual’s presence was by force.  However, the force to which the
statutes and case on which he relied adverted was force by or on behalf of the plain-
tiff. See Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35, 40 (1869).
Consider a state statute that denied entry to citizens of other states unless they
appointed a designated state official as their agent for service of process on any claim,
whether related to the state or not, for the time that the individual was in the state.
The Court would undoubtedly find such a statute unconstitutional as a burden on the
right to travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–30 (1969) overuled on
other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58 (1966); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849).
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 160 (1916) upheld an explicit appointment require-
ment, but the appointment was only for claims arising out of a non–resident’s driving
in New Jersey, not for all claims.  Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) up-
held implicit appointment, but the statute there had the same restrictions as the stat-
ute in Kane. See Chapter 90, General Laws of Massachusetts, as amended by Stat.
1923, c. 431, § 2, reprinted in Hess, 274 U.S. at 354.  Justice Butler’s opinion in Hess
noted that individuals have a constitutionally protected right to be in any state and to
transact business there, Hess, 274 U.S. at 355–56 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1),
and, further, that “[t]he mere transaction of business in a state by nonresident natural
persons does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts.” Id. at 355
(citing Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919)).
[A] state in effect may require an individual’s consent to specific jurisdiction
as a condition of driving or doing business within the state. But a state may
not reasonably require this individual, as a condition for mere entry or occa-
sional business, to consent to general jurisdiction over litigation arising
outside of the state.
Brilmayer et al., supra note 106, at 771.  If a state cannot extract consent to general
jurisdiction explicitly or implicitly from an individual’s presence in the state to trans-
act business, then how can general jurisdiction exist simply by virtue of the individ-
ual’s presence?
231. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
232. Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
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There are two possible answers.  First, perhaps an individual’s phys-
ical presence is “special” because of the history to which Justice Scalia
adverted in Burnham233 and that Justice Brennan disputed.234  Sec-
ond, perhaps Justice Scalia’s view of International Shoe’s minimum-
contacts approach as applying only to absent defendants235 is cor-
rect.236  Neither answer explains why the Court views corporations as
present for jurisdictional purposes only at their “domiciles” or “essen-
tial” homes but individuals present wherever a process server may
find them.
Corporations are no more physically “present” at their essential
homes than anywhere else.  The Court uses those locations as pres-
ence proxies; they serve, as Justice Ginsburg said, as analogies to an
individual’s domicile.237  Although an individual can have only one
domicile at a time,238 a corporation can have two for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction.239  Consider, however, what makes a corporation’s
principal place of business in a state where it is not incorporated its
“domicile.”  It cannot be merely its legal affiliation with the state be-
cause the only formal affiliation it can have is an authorization to do
233. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610–16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). But see
infra notes 278–282 and accompanying text.
234. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010) (citing
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.18 (1978)).
235. Id. at 620 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
236. Justices Scalia and Brennan clashed sharply over that view.  Justice Scalia
viewed Shaffer as a very limited decision that neither said nor implied anything about
transient jurisdiction.  Justice Brennan relied heavily on Justice Marshall’s statement
in Shaffer that, “[w]e therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). See also Burnham, 495 U.S. at
630 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623–24 (1990).
238. Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874).
A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have
been changed.  Where a change of domicile is alleged the burden of proving
it rests upon the person making the allegation.  To constitute the new domi-
cile two things are indispensable:  First, residence in the new locality; and,
second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made except
facto et animo.  Both are alike necessary.  Either without the other is insuffi-
cient.  Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot
work the change.  There must be the animus to change the prior domicile for
another.  Until the new one is acquired, the old one remains.  These princi-
ples are axiomatic in the law upon the subject.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 11(2) cmt. m (1971). Query whether, as the Court implied in Goodyear and
Daimler, it is always appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over a domiciliary who has
been absent from her domicile for some years and expects never to return. See, e.g.,
Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).  Professor Andrews demonstrates persua-
sively why the state of domicile’s attempt to exercise general jurisdiction in such a
case is manifestly unfair. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1057–58. See also id. at 1081
(“This at-home standard applies to natural persons, but, contrary to the Court’s dic-
tum, it does not always align with legal domicile.”).
239. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
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business there.  That hardly makes the principal place of business
unique.  Some corporations are authorized to do business in every
state and in many foreign countries.  The amount of corporate activity
at sites other than the principal place of business may be substantially
greater than activity at the principal place of business.  To borrow
from the Court’s relative-contacts analysis, the amount of actual busi-
ness a corporation does at its principal place of business may be only a
tiny fraction of its nationwide or worldwide business.
For example, General Motors is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Michigan.240  Its contacts with Michigan
are extensive,241 but it is unlikely that they are more than a small per-
centage of its United States business, much less its global business.
Perhaps the Daimler relative-contacts approach suggests that GM is
not “essentially at home” in Michigan even if it is formally at home
there.242  Daimler’s relative-contacts approach means that a corpora-
tion as large as GM may not be “essentially at home” anywhere.
Individuals are not “essentially at home” in any state to which they
happen to journey.  The Court functionally equates “essentially at
home” with domicile,243 and requires a corporation to be essentially at
home before a state can exercise general jurisdiction over it.  There-
fore, it should restrict general jurisdiction over individuals to their
domiciles.  The Court is trying to have the analysis both ways:  it local-
izes corporate presence in a way unrelated to the corporation’s local
activity.  Perhaps the difference between the Court’s treatment of cor-
porations and individuals is the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy.  If
that is so, the Court should drop all pretense of speaking of corporate
“contacts,” for it is not contacts that “count” at all; it is the artifice of
corporate domiciles.
International Shoe ushered in presence proxies.  Recall the Court’s
words referring to the defendant:  “if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”244  It would be no more clear that the
minimum-contacts approach recognized presence proxies if Chief Jus-
240. Selkirk v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 13–331, 2013 WL 3327377, at *3 n.3 (E.D.
Pa. 2013).
241. In addition to its corporate headquarters, GM has five of its eleven U.S. manu-
facturing sites in Michigan. See General Motor Manufacturing Plants, GM AUTH.,
http://gmauthority.com/blog/gm/gm-manufacturing/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
242. A safer conclusion might be that the Court’s construct for a corporation’s prin-
cipal place of business for diversity-jurisdiction purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2012), see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 77 (2010), is ill-suited for determina-
tions of personal jurisdiction using Daimler’s relative-contacts approach.
243. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011)).
244. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  The Court clearly intended
Shoe’s minimum-contacts analysis to apply to corporations and individuals; note the
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tice Stone had used the term explicitly.  This view of International
Shoe calls to mind Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion and its view of
Shaffer v. Heitner:
Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent
defendant, and it stands for nothing more than the proposition that
when the “minimum contact” that is a substitute for physical pres-
ence consists of property ownership it must, like other minimum
contacts, be related to the litigation.245
Whether Justice Scalia likes it or not, Shaffer changed a long estab-
lished principle of due process, but not by announcing a new theory of
due process.  In Justice Scalia’s view the Shaffer Court decided only
that the presence in the state of property unrelated to the litigation
was no longer constitutional as a presence proxy.246
In one way, Justice Scalia’s characterization of Shaffer is quite nar-
row, for he spoke of “the ‘minimum contact’”—singular—and so
clearly was not addressing general jurisdiction.  The first opportunity
he had to consider that topic came in Goodyear.  Yet, the Supreme
Court recognized general jurisdiction as a category not once or twice,
but three times.  The first time was in International Shoe with its men-
use of “he” rather than “it.”  There was no individual defendant, and throughout the
opinion, the Court referred to the corporation as “it.” See generally id.
245. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 620 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis of “a substitute for physical presence” added).  Professor An-
drews characterized this as “avoiding Shaffer’s holding that all assertions of jurisdic-
tion must be assessed under minimum contacts analysis . . . .”  Andrews, supra note
27, at 1057.
Justice Scalia’s observation does little to obscure the incongruity of his apparent
acceptance of Shaffer with his underlying constitutional theory about why mere pres-
ence in a state is sufficient even after International Shoe.
‘[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be
due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in En-
gland and in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be
due process of law. . . .  [That which], in substance, has been immemorially
the actual law of the land . . . therefor[e] is due process of law . . . .’
The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our
legal system that define the due process standard of “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884)).
One may agree or disagree with that approach to constitutional law, but the same
argument is available with respect to quasi in rem jurisdiction, which was settled in
usage for a very long time and that the Court had explicitly approved in Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), abrogated by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 630–32 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  For intellec-
tual consistency, perhaps Justice Scalia should have disapproved Shaffer rather than
distinguishing it.
246. In this respect, Justice Scalia is at war with himself and with Hurtado, on which
he relied for his view of tradition’s entitlement to continuation.
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tion of cases involving claims unrelated to the forum.247  The second
was in Perkins, and the Court allowed general jurisdiction.  The third
was Helicopteros, although the Court did not find jurisdiction there:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and
the foreign corporation.248
Thus, the category was well established; “sufficient contacts” were a
presence proxy that allowed general jurisdiction. Goodyear and
Daimler should not have changed that;249 both cases held only that the
limited contacts between the European corporate defendants and the
forums were insufficient.  On that, the Court was unanimous.  Justice
Sotomayor castigated the Daimler majority for its dicta, not its hold-
ing.250  She saw no need to undertake a major redefinition of general
jurisdiction gratuitously.
Nonetheless, the Court did exactly that, but in the process it made
clear that corporate contacts no longer count in the way everyone has
understood them since 1945.  The sweeping language of Goodyear and
Daimler suggests that it does not matter how much business a corpo-
ration does in the forum, or how many employees, manufacturing
sites, or other offices it has there.  All that matters is the formal affilia-
tion that one might call “corporate domicile,” (borrowing the analogy
to individuals that the Court used) except in what Justice Ginsburg
characterized as the extraordinary case.251
General Motors has eleven manufacturing sites in the United
States.252 Five are in Michigan, and there is one each in Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas.  Each facility is on a large
site253 and has been in operation for decades.254  The Kansas facility
247. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (referring to “continuous corporate operations
within a state so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”).
248. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)
(footnote and citations omitted).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
250. See Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764–65 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
251. The example she gave in both cases was Perkins, but as I have pointed out, it
really is not an exception to the Goodyear-Daimler approach but rather is entirely
consistent with it. See supra note 163.  The Perkins Court itself pointed out the less
than overwhelming nature of Benguet’s forum contacts. See supra text accompanying
note 96.
252. See General Motors Manufacturing Plants, GM AUTH., http://gmauthority
.com/blog/gm/gm-manufacturing/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
253. Id. (Indiana, 2.85 million square feet on 716 acres; Kansas, 572 acres; Ken-
tucky, 1 million square feet on 212 acres, Missouri, 3.7 million square feet; Ohio, 6
million square feet; Texas, 3.75 million square feet on 250 acres).
254. Id. (Indiana, 1986; Kansas, 1987; Kentucky, 1981; Missouri, 1983; Ohio, 1966;
Texas, 1954).
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has 3,900 employees and produces one car every fifty-eight seconds.255
Goodyear-Daimler may suggest that such activities cannot support
general jurisdiction, but justifying that result in terms of “contacts”
seems absurd, especially when compared with either a place of incor-
poration with which the corporation has no other connection256 or an
individual’s temporary presence in a state.
There are two ways to attempt to resolve the absurdity.  First,
Goodyear and Daimler may have let the air out of Burnham’s tires.257
Second, a more conservative approach would not take the Court’s
dicta seriously, leaving Burnham unimpaired.  The three cases cannot,
however, co-exist on the basis of “contacts.” Goodyear and Daimler
were easy cases258 once the Court declined to impute the contacts of
the parent (Goodyear) or the subsidiary (Daimler) to the foreign de-
fendant.  That is why they are such weak support for a broader rule.
The Court has never heard a general jurisdiction case involving the
sort of systematic, continuous, and voluminous contacts that GM has
with six states other than Michigan.259  One may speculate that the
Court would find those contacts sufficient to serve as presence prox-
ies, but one cannot know.  If the Court would allow general jurisdic-
tion, then Goodyear and Daimler stand as isolated cases, and their
dicta become less important.  If the Court would refuse jurisdiction,
then Goodyear and Daimler have major case implications for general
jurisdiction over individuals.
The Court has declared it inappropriate that corporations be sub-
ject to general jurisdiction in places not their “homes,” apart from the
forum contacts the corporation may have.  There is nothing inherently
unreasonable about that position; the unreasonableness is permitting
states to exercise general jurisdiction over transient individuals.  The
imbalance between the Court’s treatment of general jurisdiction with
respect to corporations on one hand and individuals on the other is
unseemly.  The unreasonableness of transient jurisdiction becomes
255. See Fairfax Assembly Plan – Fairfax, Kansas, USA, GM AUTH., http://gmau
thority.com/blog/gm/gm-manufacturing/gm-fairfax-assembly/ (last visited July 10,
2014).
256. See supra note 226.
257. Ms. Eng suggested that conclusion after Goodyear. See Eng, supra note 165,
at 849.  I agree. Daimler’s relative-contacts approach drives (so to speak) the point
home. See infra notes 265–86 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 145–61 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 150–61 and accompanying text.  Professor Pielemeier suggests
that Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) is such a case. See Pielemeier,
supra note 28. Allstate arose “from a fatal Wisconsin accident involving individuals
who, at the time of the accident, all resided in Wisconsin.  The claim involved insur-
ance coverage under an insurance policy delivered in Wisconsin.”  Pielemeier, supra
note 28, at 985 (footnotes omitted).  “There is no indication that Allstate objected to
personal jurisdiction.  It must have assumed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds would be denied, because although it had delivered the policy in Wisconsin
(presumably from a Wisconsin office), it was ‘doing business’ in Minnesota.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
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more apparent when one applies to it the factors that, at least accord-
ing to some scholars, are appropriate in considering general jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations.260
A. General Jurisdiction Over the Individual
Convenience for the defendant is minimal.  By hypothesis, presence
is temporary, and the plaintiff’s claim is unrelated to the defendant’s
presence in the forum.  Convenience for the plaintiff is, at best, mixed.
The plaintiff chose the forum for some reason (for example, the plain-
tiff’s residence) but the claim’s unrelatedness will make the litigation
more difficult because evidence and witnesses likely are not in the
forum.
The state has a limited sovereignty interest because the claim has
nothing to do with in-state activity.  If the plaintiff is a state citizen,
the state has some sovereignty interest.  On the other hand, its sover-
eignty interest may clash with (1) the sovereignty interest of the state
where the cause of action arose and (2) the sovereignty interest of the
defendant’s domicile.
Reciprocity is minimal because the defendant’s presence is only
temporary.  No one today would quarrel with a forum’s entitlement to
exercise specific jurisdiction.  However, it is one thing to tell the indi-
vidual that presence in the forum allows the forum’s courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction with respect to forum activities but quite another
to say that the individual’s entire life is fair game for forum
adjudication.
Professor Andrews’ additional factor—predictability—is mixed as
well.  General jurisdiction is predictable in the abstract; if Burnham
remains the law, individuals are on notice that any forum where they
receive a summons may exercise jurisdiction over any claim.  On the
other hand, there is the unpredictability of never knowing whether
one will receive service for such claims, as one travels from place to
place.
B. General Jurisdiction Over the Corporation
Now consider the corporation that does regular business in a forum
that is neither its state of incorporation nor its principal place of busi-
ness.  Apple boasts, “We have corporate offices all over the world,
from Cupertino to London to Shanghai.”261  It is a California corpora-
260. See supra text accompanying note 167.  Professor Brilmayer and her col-
leagues list (1) convenience for the defendant; (2) convenience for the plaintiff;
(3) the forum state’s sovereignty interest, and 4) reciprocal benefits and burdens. See
Brilmayer, et al., supra note 167.  Professor Andrews also includes predictability. See
Andrews, supra note 27, at 1000.
261. See Jobs at Apple, APPLE, INC., https://www.apple.com/jobs/us/corporate.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
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tion with its headquarters there.262  It has extensive worldwide opera-
tions.263  It operates retail stores worldwide,264 including ten stores in
the New York City metropolitan area.
Considering the same factors applied to the transient individual,
striking disparities appear.  With respect to the defendant’s conve-
nience, it would be far easier for Apple to defend a claim unrelated to
New York in that state than for (1) an individual tourist there for a
week, (2) a family including a high school senior visiting Columbia
University for a day, or (3) a New Jersey couple coming to the city one
evening to see a Broadway play.  There is no reason to anticipate dis-
parity in convenience for the plaintiff or in New York’s sovereignty
interest.
Reciprocity presents the starkest contrast.265  The individual trav-
eler receives benefits from New York:  access to its historical sites and
theaters, police, fire, sanitation and emergency medical services, and
public transportation.  Apple, operating continuously in New York,
benefits from these same services, not merely for an evening, a day or
a week, but every day of every year.  It benefits from access to New
York’s resident, commuter and tourist population.  The benefits Ap-
ple receives from New York far outstrip the transient individuals.266
262. See Apple, Inc., Annual Report  (September 28, 2013), http://files.shareholder
.com/downloads/AAPL/3351394991x0x701402/A406AD58-6BDE-4190-96A1-4CC2D
0D67986/AAPL_FY13_10K_10.30.13.pdf (Sept. 28, 2013) (last visited Oct. 7, 2014)
(state of incorporation). See also Jobs at Apple, APPLE, INC., https://www.apple.com/
about/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (corporate headquarters).
263. See Apple, Inc., Annual Report (September 28, 2013) at 2, http://files.sharehol
der.com/downloads/AAPL/3351394991x0x701402/A406AD58-6BDE-4190-96A1-4CC
2D0D67986/AAPL_FY13_10K_10.30.13.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
The Company manages its business primarily on a geographic basis. Accord-
ingly, the Company determined its reportable operating segments, which are
generally based on the nature and location of its customers, to be the Ameri-
cas, Europe, Japan, Greater China, Rest of Asia Pacific, and Retail.  The
Americas segment includes both North and South America.  The Europe
segment includes European countries, as well as India, the Middle East and
Africa.  The Greater China segment includes China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The Rest of Asia, Pacific segment includes Australia and Asian countries,
other than those countries included in the Company’s other operating seg-
ments.  The Retail segment operates Apple retail stores in 13 countries, in-
cluding the U.S. Each operating segment provides similar hardware and
software products and similar services.  The results of the Company’s geo-
graphic segments do not include results of the Retail segment.
Id.
264. See id. at 5.
265. Ms. Eng suggests that “The Supreme Court’s citation of Brilmayer’s article
may signal a preference for the reciprocal benefits and burdens theory as the strong-
est justification for the application of general jurisdiction and an endorsement of
domicile as the exclusive basis for general jurisdiction over individuals.”  Eng, supra
note 165, at 865.
266. Both types of defendants also bear the burdens of being in New York, but it is
safe to assume that the benefits outweigh the burdens; otherwise rational behavior
would avoid New York.
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One final reciprocity comparison graphically underlines the dispar-
ity.  In Burnham, Justice Brennan discussed reciprocity for the
individual:
Subject only to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, an out-of-
state plaintiff may use state courts in all circumstances in which
those courts would be available to state citizens. Without transient
jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise:  a transient would have the
full benefit of the power of the forum State’s courts as a plaintiff
while retaining immunity from their authority as a defendant.267
Transient jurisdiction enforces that reciprocity against the individual:
Goodyear and Daimler erase it with respect to corporations.268
Would the Court allow general jurisdiction in those three transient
individuals and over Apple, assuming service in the forum?  With re-
spect to the individuals, Burnham says general jurisdiction exists.
With respect to Apple, Goodyear and Daimler muddy the waters.
They seem to cut against general jurisdiction over Apple.269 Daimler
trumpets the Court’s dissatisfaction with the doing-business approach
to general jurisdiction.270  Yet, Goodyear seemed to contemplate gen-
eral jurisdiction based on “continuous and systematic” in-state corpo-
rate activity.271  Perhaps that is a reason not to take Goodyear
seriously—or at least literally—in cases involving extensive corporate
forum activity and not requiring imputation of contacts.  Apple is do-
ing business in New York. Goodyear and Daimler leave open the
question of whether Apple’s activities exceed simply “doing business”
enough to qualify for general jurisdiction—that is, to make Apple “es-
sentially at home.”  So much for predictability.
In contacts terms, the comparison between Apple and the individu-
als is not even close.  Apple has continuous and systematic contacts
with New York.  The individuals have isolated contacts.  It will be dif-
ficult for the Court to explain why it is consistent with due process to
exercise general jurisdiction over the individuals but not over Apple.
267. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990) (citation omitted). But see
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (permitting jurisdiction by counterclaim over
non-resident plaintiff otherwise immune from jurisdiction and thus re-establishing
reciprocity in that respect).
268. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  That may not be the asymmetry that
Justice Brennan had in mind, but if one substitutes “corporation” for the second oc-
currence of “transient” in the quotation, the asymmetry is just as troubling. Burn-
ham, 495 U.S. at 638.
269.  Perkins, which the Court characterizes as the extraordinary case for which
general jurisdiction exists away from the diversity loci really is not, because of the
relocation, albeit temporary, of Benguet’s principal place of business. See Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952).
270. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. See also supra text accompanying note 133.
271. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (“continuous and systematic affiliation”). See
also id. at 2857 (“‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary
to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to any-
thing that connects them to the State”).
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Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues suggested considering
whether “the defendant reaches the quantum of activity in which a
purely local company would engage.”272  Apple satisfies that test in
New York.  Transient individuals will rarely reach that level.
It is inconceivable that the individuals are “essentially at home” in
New York. Goodyear and Daimler make it unclear whether the Court
would characterize Apple as “essentially at home” there, given the
Court’s concern about universal general jurisdiction over large corpo-
rations.  “A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them.  Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synon-
ymous with ‘doing business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction
evolved in the United States.”273  The Goodyear and Daimler Courts
appear less concerned with universal general jurisdiction over peripa-
tetic individuals.
Daimler’s introduction of relative contacts makes the Court’s anom-
alous treatment of corporations and individuals for purposes of gen-
eral jurisdiction even harder to accept.  All of the individuals
mentioned above have “a ‘far larger quantum of . . . activity’ having
no connection to any in-state activity”274 than they have in-state activ-
ity.  The parallel to Daimler’s argument is unmistakable.  “Nothing in
International Shoe and its progeny suggests that ‘a particular quantum
of local activity’ should give a State authority over a ‘far larger quan-
tum of . . . activity’ having no connection to any in-state activity.”275  If
a corporation does not open its entire corporate life for forum adjudi-
cation by doing business in a state, it cannot be consistent with due
process for a transient individual to open his entire life to forum
adjudication.
If the Court still believes that reasonableness has some role to play
in constitutional jurisdiction,276 it must either ignore reasonableness
272. Brilmayer et al., supra note 106, at 742.
273. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. See also id. at 760–61 (citation omitted)
(“Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified, and
approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘en-
gages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.’ . . . . That for-
mulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping”).
274. Id. (quoting Feder, supra note 48, at 694).
275. Id.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
276. Note, however, that the Court eschewed the reasonableness inquiry in
Daimler:
The majority evidently agrees that, if the reasonableness prong were to ap-
ply, it would be unreasonable for California courts to exercise jurisdiction
over Daimler in this case.  See ante, at 761–62 (noting that it would be “ex-
orbitant” for California courts to exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler,
a German defendant, in this “Argentina-rooted case” brought by “foreign
plaintiffs”).  But instead of resolving the case on this uncontroversial basis,
the majority reaches out to decide it on a ground neither argued nor decided
below.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation and
footnote omitted).
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entirely when considering jurisdiction over transient individuals or as-
sert it only as an ipse dixit.  The explanation that we have always done
things that way is unpersuasive.277  Justice Holmes observed,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.278
If there is a justification for transient jurisdiction other than blind imi-
tation of the past,279 no one has articulated it.
There is another reason to be skeptical about regarding past prac-
tice as strong support for the continuation of transient jurisdiction.
Modern procedure had not developed; civil arrest—or its equivalent
in the form of seizure of the defendant’s property—was the only way
to begin a case.280  However, to paraphrase International Shoe, the ca-
277. In Burnham, Justice Brennan argued in favor of jurisdiction based on the de-
fendant’s having enjoyed the benefits and protections of California law during his
three days there.  It is inconceivable that Justice Brennan’s mode of analysis would
have led him to concur in either Goodyear or Daimler.  Giant corporations operating
in the forum receive far more benefits and protections than an individual sojourning
for three days ever could.  Recall that Justice Brennan dissented on general-jurisdic-
tion in Helicopteros, though acknowledging the plausibility of the majority’s view. See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984); see also
supra text accompanying note 154.
278. Oliver W. Holmes, Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 212 (1977) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316), expressed the same view less
bluntly:  “‘[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ can be as readily
offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the
adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu-
tional heritage.”
279. There is an unstated assumption underlying the argument based solely on his-
tory: that such cases are examples of what today the Court refers to as general juris-
diction.  There is no evidentiary support for such an assumption.  Perhaps cases in
courts outside the defendant’s domicile were predominantly cases that today would
be specific-jurisdiction cases, as Professor Twitchell argued. See Twitchell, supra note
146, at 618 (“Despite the power-based nature of jurisdiction doctrine, . . . courts did
not completely ignore the nature of the cause of action and only occasionally decided
disputes having no relationship with the forum.”). If that is so, history’s support for
transient is at least partly illusory.
280. Not until the eighteenth century did the capias give way to the summons, and
that change came about not through the common law, but by statutes that forbade
using capias in cases of lesser value. See Hazard, supra note 164, at 248 n.19.  That so
many statutes (Professor Hazard listed eight) were necessary demonstrates the ubiq-
uity of the capias.  Reliance on the capias was so fixed that early cases held that one
could not sue corporations in tort, there being no way to execute the writ. See Meares
v. Comm’rs of Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73, 78 (1948). But see Denver & Rio Grande Ry.
Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887) (quoting State v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 23 N.J.L
369 (1852)):
“[I]t is now perfectly well settled, contrary to the ancient authorities, that a
corporation is liable civiliter for all torts committed by its servants or agents
by authority of the corporation, express or implied . . . . The result of the
modern cases is that a corporation is liable civiliter for torts committed by its
servants or agents precisely as a natural person; and that it is liable as a
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pias ad respondendum “has given way to personal service of the sum-
mons or other form of notice.”281  That procedural shift means that
the grounds underlying the capias ad respondendum “have vanished
long since. . . .”282  Perhaps nothing demonstrates this better than the
proliferation of state statutes allowing extraterritorial service.283
Consider Burnham again.284  Mr. Burnham was in California on
business for three days.  While there, he received service of process in
a divorce action, and the unanimous Court ruled that jurisdiction ex-
isted simply by that fact.  Suppose that Mr. Burnham had received
service of process at his home in New Jersey “by first-class mail, post-
age prepaid, requiring a return receipt.”285  It is almost unthinkable286
that a unanimous Court still have said that California jurisdiction ex-
isted on the divorce claim.  On the other hand, it is highly unlikely
that today’s Court, following the rationale of Goodyear and Daimler,
will overrule the unanimous decision in Burnham, barely twenty-five
years old, although only Justices Scalia and Kennedy remain on the
Court from that time.  The third possibility is that the Court will fol-
low Goodyear and Daimler with respect to corporations and Burnham
with respect to individuals.  That would require the Court to explain
natural person for the acts of its agents done by its authority, express or
implied, though there be neither a written appointment under seal, nor a
vote of the corporation constituting the agency or authorizing the act.”
Denver, 122 U.S. at 597 (quoting Morris, 23 N.J.L 369).
281. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
282. See Holmes, supra note 278, at 469 (emphasis added).
283. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 415.40 (West 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (Consol.
1999).
284. See supra notes 210–223 and accompanying text.
285. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 415.40.
286. In Burnham, Justice Scalia criticizing Justice Brennan’s reasonableness analy-
sis that rested on Mr. Burnham’s having benefited from his three days in California,
deemed the possibility beyond discussion:
Three days’ worth of these benefits strike us as powerfully inadequate to
establish, as an abstract matter, that it is “fair” for California to decree the
ownership of all Mr. Burnham’s worldly goods acquired during the 10 years
of his marriage, and the custody over his children. We daresay a contractual
exchange swapping those benefits for that power would not survive the “un-
conscionability” provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Even less per-
suasive are the other “fairness” factors alluded to by Justice Brennan. It
would create “an asymmetry,” we are told, if Burnham were permitted (as
he is) to appear in California courts as a plaintiff, but were not compelled to
appear in California courts as defendant; and travel being as easy as it is
nowadays, and modern procedural devices being so convenient, it is no great
hardship to appear in California courts. . . .  In other words, even if one
agreed with Justice Brennan’s conception of an equitable bargain, the “bene-
fits” we have been discussing would explain why it is “fair” to assert general
jurisdiction over Burnham-returned-to-New-Jersey-after-service only at the
expense of proving that it is also “fair” to assert general jurisdiction over
Burnham-returned-to-New-Jersey-without-service—which we know does
not conform with “contemporary notions of due process.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 49 U.S. 604, 623–24 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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why corporations should receive more immunity from general juris-
diction than individuals do.  The disparity should be unthinkable; cog-
nitive dissonance should forbid it.
Consider one last hypothetical.  Under Burnham, an individual who
performs a single lawful act in a state is subject to general jurisdiction
if he receives process while there, even if that visit was his only con-
tact with the state, and the single act was entirely lawful.  On the other
hand, if the individual never goes to the state, but his agent goes and
performs the same single, lawful act, the individual is not subject to
general jurisdiction even if the agent receives service of process in the
same action against the individual.  It is difficult to explain the diver-
gent results in due process terms, except on Justice Scalia’s historical
theory.
That may be difficult, but it is quite impossible to explain the results
in Daimler’s relative-contacts terms.  In the first variation the individ-
ual was in the forum only once, and in the second he spent his entire
life outside the forum.  Perhaps the Court would seek to turn aside
this criticism on the ground that “corporations are different.”  That
merely begs the question of why, for purposes of general jurisdiction,
they are different.  None of the Court’s jurisprudence of personal ju-
risdiction, from Pennoyer to Daimler, answers that question.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Shaffer v. Heitner,287 some courts288 and schol-
ars recognized its potential to undermine transient jurisdiction, and
287. See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
288. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Conference of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47 (3d.
Cir. 1985):
If the mere presence of property cannot support quasi in rem jurisdiction, it
is difficult to find a basis in logic and fairness to conclude that the more
fleeting physical presence of a non-resident person can support personal ju-
risdiction. . .  We conclude therefore that neither logic nor history supports
personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association solely on the basis
of service on its agent within the forum.
See also Harold M. Pittman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312–13
(N.D. Ill. 1986):
We now hold that, under Shaffer, mere service of process upon a defendant
transiently present in the jurisdiction does not vest a state with personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant.  Personal service within the jurisdiction is not
the litmus test for proper in personam jurisdiction.  Rather, the test is
whether the defendant has had minimum contacts with the forum “such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”
. . . .
Were the court to hold that minimum contacts need not be present for an
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant present in the jurisdic-
tion when served, the court would thereby accord less protection to an indi-
vidual defendant than to his or her property within the state. Surely the
Shaffer Court did not intend such an illogical and unfair result.
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more than one scholar questioned its foundation.289  “Indeed, the Pen-
noyer notion that state power extends to all defendants physically
within the forum may have perished in Shaffer v. Heitner, in which the
Supreme Court held that all assertions of state jurisdiction must sat-
isfy the standard of fairness based on minimum contacts set forth in
International Shoe.”290  Nonetheless, two years after that statement,
Burnham v. Superior Court291 delivered a unanimous endorsement of
transient jurisdiction (to the dismay of the academy292), albeit without
a majority rationale.
Goodyear and, particularly, Daimler undermine Burnham.  Some
lower courts and scholars293 have attributed that effect to Goodyear.
Giraldo v. Drummond Company, Inc.294 explicitly applied Goodyear’s
essentially-at-home approach, refusing to find general jurisdiction and
noting that a defendant’s presence in the forum would be insufficient
But see Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1985) (foot-
note omitted):
The source of the commentators’ gloom rests principally on the following
statement in Shaffer.  “We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny.”  . . . ([E]mphasis added).  We concede
that this sweeping assertion undermines the correspondingly categorical
claim that “[i]t has long been black letter law that personal service within its
geographical area establishes a court’s personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.”  . . .  However, while Shaffer may have rendered the black letter gray,
we do not think the letter of the law has become so pale that it can be read
only with conjurer’s glasses.
Accord, Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds
sub. nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (“[I]f a defendant is found and
served within the state, minimum contacts need not be established, and jurisdiction
may be asserted on the basis of the state’s sovereignty.”); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F.
Supp. 591, 593–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial
Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
289. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5, cmt. a (1982)
(expressing doubt with respect to transient jurisdiction after Shaffer); 4 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 48, § 1067.1, at 430 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s conclusion appeared to
bring into question the continued validity of jurisdiction secured by ‘tagging.’”);
Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV.
37, 99–100 (1989) (“Read together, Ireland [Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)] and Shaffer render suspect the proposi-
tion that a state necessarily has unrestrained power over all persons served while
physically present within its territory, and even over all domiciliaries, regardless of the
amount of ongoing contact they have with the state.”); Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v.
Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25
VILL. L. REV. 38, 54 (1979).
290. Brilmayer et al., supra note 106, at 749 (footnote omitted).
291. Burnham, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
292. See, e.g., Robert Taylor-Manning, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham
v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 623, 623
(1991).
293. See Eng, supra note 165, at 849 (arguing that transient jurisdiction should no
longer be available); Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 991 (same).
294. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2012 WL 2358306, at *7–8
(N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012).
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“even if [he] stayed in Alabama for weeks at a time. . . .  Coming to
Alabama for the sake of his employment is vastly at odds with being
‘essentially at home’ in Alabama.”295  Other courts have also used the
Goodyear approach.296  “General jurisdiction based on contacts is an
integral part of minimum contacts analysis, and it seemingly should
apply to individuals, just as the specific jurisdiction component
does.”297  Both cases antedate Daimler’s reaffirmation of Goodyear’s
essentially-at-home test and introduction of the relative-contacts ap-
proach, making its centrality to general jurisdiction analysis
unmistakable.
If the constitutional test for general jurisdiction is “essentially at
home,” transient jurisdiction cannot stand.  If the Court would try to
save it, it can do so only on the ground that it is a practice so long
recognized;298 nothing other than history’s dead hand appears to sup-
port it.  As I said at the outset, something has got to give.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Ford v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, No. 13-6317, 2014 WL 693926, at *8
(E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2014) (reading Goodyear to require that an individual defendant
“is fairly regarded as at home in the forum state”); Red Strokes Entm’t, Inc. v. San-
derson, No. 3:12-CV-0008, 2012 WL 1514892 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2012).
297. Andrews, supra note 27, at 1055.
298. See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.  But jurisdiction over corpo-
rations based on substantial contacts with the forum (before International Shoe under
the banner of “corporate presence”) was long established as well. See, e.g., Phila. &
Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (“A foreign corporation is
amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it
is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the
inference that it is present there.”); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 109, 111
(1898) (recognizing “doing business” as a predicate for jurisdiction over a corpora-
tion, even when the action was unrelated to the forum).
